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SYMBOLS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
 
Symbols 
𝐶 Cost 
𝑁𝑅𝑥𝑀𝑎𝑥 N=number of, R=receivers, x=variable, Max=maximum 
𝑆𝑇𝑥 S=set, T=transmitters, x=variable 
 
Abbreviations 
1oo2 One Out Of Two (works with any numbers, #oo#) 
AD Accidental Damage 
BDA Big Data analytics 
CBM Condition-Based Maintenance 
CD Condition Dependent 
DNV GL Det Norske Veritas & Germanischer Lloyd 
DS Design Science 
ED Environmental Deterioration 
FBD Functional Block Diagram 
FD Fatigue Damage 
FF Failure-Finding 
FMEA Failure Mode and Effects Analysis 
FMECA Failure Mode, Effects, and Criticality Analysis 
FTA Fault Tree Analysis 
GBS Gravity Base Structure 
IoT Internet of Things 
KISS Keep it simple, stupid 
LCC Life Cycle Cost 
LTA Logic Tree Analysis 
Ltd. Limited Company 
MMIS Maintenance Management Information System 
MTBF Mean Time between Failures 
MTTF Mean Time to Failure 
MTTR Mean Time to Repair 
NDI Non-Destructive Inspection 
OLAP Online Analytic Processing 
PT&I Predictive Testing and Inspection 
RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety 
RBD Reliability Block Diagram 
RCM Reliability-Centered Maintenance 
RTF Run-To-Failure 
SQL  Structured Query Language 
SSI Structurally Significant Item 
TBM Time-Based Maintenance 
TD Time Dependent  
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ABSTRACT: 
 
Customers in different industries, such as marine, oil & gas, and energy sectors, are demanding more 
advanced and tailored services to match maintenance activities with their business needs and to optimize 
operating expenditures and inventory of the facilities without compromising reliability. Reliability-centered 
maintenance (RCM) is a well-known method in the industry for systematically analyzing and modifying 
standard maintenance plans to optimize asset availability and minimize total cost of ownership. 
 
Research question: How to develop a systematic method to analyze customers’ asset and business to 
optimize maintenance plan for long term service agreement? For answering the question, research is 
performed with a qualitative method (interviews) and design science (DS) method. Interviewed persons 
are: A specialist from Wärtsilä Marine Business Asset Management Services and Reliability Specialist 
from Ramentor Oy. Design science is information technology-based outcome of research. 
 
The purpose of this study is to execute a servitization model for the services agreements business. The focus 
is to develop a maintenance analysis process for life cycle solutions for preventing the unexpected failures 
and their consequences as a part of the RCM process. Monitoring, collecting and processing data is a key 
factor to success. The best equipment for real-time monitoring and collecting data is performed by using 
IoT (internet of things) solutions. 
 
Key findings of the study revealed that case company should develop and document a streamlined RCM 
process to create tailored maintenance plans of customers’ assets, considering installation configuration 
and customer’s business needs. In addition, the documented process enables case company to engage in 
discussions with classification societies regarding approval of Service Supplier notation for the streamlined 
RCM concept. 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: Maintenance management, RCM, Optimization, Servitization 
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TIIVISTELMÄ: 
 
Asiakkaat eri teollisuudenaloilla, kuten merenkulku-, öljy & kaasu-, ja energiasektoreilla, vaativat 
kehittyneempiä ja räätälöityjä palveluita saadakseen kunnossapitotoimet vastaamaan yrityksen tarpeisiin, 
sekä optimoidakseen operointikulunsa ja inventaarion, luotettavuutta heikentämättä. 
Toimintavarmuuskeskeinen kunnossapito (RCM) on teollisuudessa tunnettu menetelmä järjestelmälliseen 
analysointiin ja standardin huoltosuunnitelman muokkaamiseen, optimoidakseen resurssien saatavuuden ja 
minimoidakseen omistajuuden kokonaiskustannukset. 
 
Tutkimuskysymys: Miten kehitetään järjestelmällinen menetelmä asiakkaiden resurssien ja liiketoiminnan 
analysointiin, jolla optimoidaan huoltosuunnitelma pitkäaikaisia huoltosopimuksia varten? 
Tutkimuskysymyksen vastaus saavutetaan kvalitatiivisella (haastattelut) sekä tietojärjestelmätutkimuksen 
(design science) menetelmillä. Haastatellut henkilöt ovat: Spesialisti Wärtsilän merenkulkuliiketoiminnan 
huoltosopimusyksiköstä, sekä luotettavuuteen erikoistunut spesialisti Ramentor Oy:stä. 
Tietojärjestelmätutkimus on informaatioteknologiakeskeinen tutkimusmenetelmä. 
 
Tutkimuksen tarkoitus on toteuttaa palvelullistaminen ratkaisujen (solutions) liiketoimintamallina. Työn 
keskipisteessä on elinkaariratkaisujen huoltoanalyysiprosessin kehittäminen odottamattomien vikojen 
ehkäisemiseksi, joka on osana RCM -prosessia. Monitorointi sekä data kerääminen ja prosessointi, ovat 
onnistumisen avaintekijöitä. Paras tapa reaaliaikaiseen monitorointiin sekä datan keräämiseen onnistuu 
IoT:n (esineiden internet) avulla. 
 
Tutkimuksen keskeiset löydökset osoittavat, että case -yrityksen kannattaa kehittää ja dokumentoida 
virtaviivainen RCM-prosessi luodakseen räätälöityjä huoltosuunnitelmia vastaamaan asiakkaiden 
resurssien ja liiketoiminnan tarpeisiin, ottaen huomioon eri installaatioiden rakenne. Lisäksi dokumentoitu 
prosessi edesauttaa case-yrityksen ryhtymistä neuvotteluihin luokituslaitosten kanssa, saadakseen 
hyväksyntä luotettavana palveluntarjoajana virtaviivaistetulle RCM -konseptille. 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________________________________ 
AVAINSANAT: Huollonhallintajärjestelmä, RCM, Optimointi, Palvelullistaminen  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Service as business logic is a globally growing trend (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988:314). 
Customer demand-driven service, in several different industries, is adding value to 
corporations’ core businesses (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988:314). Creating customer 
value is a multilane process that consists of two distinct sub-processes: supplier’s process 
of providing resources for customers use; and customers’ process to turn service into 
value (Grönroos & Ravald, 2011:5). 
“Smart organizations know they can no longer afford to see 
maintenance as just an expense” (Knutsen, Manno & Vartdal, 
2014:2) 
Inside the big industrial companies integrating the maintenance is important within the 
business cycle for guarantying predictability, growth, and improve the overall quality of 
operations. The organization needs to get rid of an old-school regime, time schedule-
based maintenance with on-condition maintenance. A new-school version of maintenance 
regime is data-driven and risk-based, which leads to more accurate and better on-time 
maintenance tasks, as well as avoiding downtime caused by a failure. Practical advantages 
gained by smarter maintenance are lower costs, increased safety, and availability of ship 
systems. (Knutsen, et al., 2014:2) 
 
1.1. Background 
 
Customers of Wärtsilä includes marine, oil & gas, and energy sectors. The customers are 
demanding more advanced and tailored services to match maintenance activities with 
their business needs and to optimize operating expenditures and inventory of the facilities 
without compromising reliability. Reliability-centered maintenance (RCM) is a well-
known method in different fields of industries. RCM is used to systematically analyze 
and modify standard maintenance plans to optimize asset availability and minimize total 
cost of ownership. The issue is, that Wärtsilä has not been using the RCM method 
effectively as a tool of service solutions. 
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Therefore, the research question is: How to develop a systematic method to analyze 
customers’ asset and business to optimize maintenance plan for long term service 
agreement? RCM method will be forming the base of the theory and then be further 
examined in the research section, in co-operatio with Ramentor’s reliability specialist. 
RCM procedures consist of 7 steps for the maintenance processes, among industrial 
management literature, as well as practically used in different industries. This thesis is a 
part of developing and improving a risk assessment by launching the RCM process for 
Wärtsilä Services. An objective for the maintenance analysis process is to optimize life 
cycle costs (LCC) and availability, focusing on whichever is the best serving the 
customers’ requirements to reach their goals. 
 
This thesis strives for resulting a service logic, which provides an understanding of the 
process of value creation and its implications. It offers a terminology that supports 
researchers and practitioners understanding different roles of suppliers and customers in 
value creation and analyzing opportunities for value co-creation. 
 
The main aim for this thesis is to develop and document a streamlined RCM process for 
Wärtsilä to create tailored maintenance plans of customers’ assets considering installation 
configuration and customer’s business needs. The scope of the thesis is limited to 
streamlined RCM process development and documentation for engine systems. The study 
utilizes the RCM method approach but also applies an FTA method to simulate the best 
performance. The focus will be in maintenance management. Used methods aim to 
comprehensively answer to the research question. In addition, the documented process 
enables Wärtsilä to engage in discussions with classification societies regarding approval 
of Service Supplier notation for the streamlined RCM concept. 
 
1.2. Structure of the thesis 
 
The structure of the thesis follows problem arrangement and the chosen research 
methodology. The introduction is followed by a chapter that forms the theory of service 
as business logic. The third chapter discusses maintenance management in general, 
including the definition of standards and guidelines that are relevant for the case study. 
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The fourth chapter defines a theory of traditional RCM and FTA methods 
comprehensively. These background and theory chapters are then followed by the entire 
research case: Wärtsilä Services –chapter, which consists of explaining research methods 
and data collecting, background information of Wärtsilä Services, and then modified and 
streamlined RCM process thoroughly. Last chapters are conclusions and references. 
 
1.3. Research approach 
 
Research approach of this case study includes a plan and procedure that consist of the 
steps: data collection, analysis, and interpretation. Data collection was carried out during 
a couple of interactive discussions with the Specialist from Wärtsilä Marine Business 
Asset Management Services, and Reliability Specialist from Ramentor Oy. Therefore, the 
data collection follows partly qualitative approach, claiming transformative knowledge 
of developing the RCM method for the case study, and partly design science (DS) method. 
Asking some open-ended questions, but mainly the research data is collected and further 
analyzed from the interactive discussion. (Denzin & Lincoln, 1994) 
 
Design science (DS) research methodology is an information technology-based outcome 
of research. DS offers guidelines for evaluation and iteration within research projects and 
focuses on designed items development and performance, with the intention of improving 
its functional performance. DS creates and evaluates information systems as an intention 
to solve identified organizational problems. Defining DS as any designed object with a 
fixed solution to an understood research problem. (Peffers, Tuunanen, Rothenberger & 
Chatterjee, 2007)  
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2. LITERATURE & THEORY 
 
Adding value to corporations’ core business offerings through the service is a growing 
trend in business. Through the world, through the industries, the trend is a customer 
demand-driven, and perceive corporations to sharpen their competitive boundaries 
(Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988:314-315). According to Grönroos & Ravald (2011) could 
be problematic to determine if a product provides value for an individual or organization, 
without understanding multiple different ways that product is used. It is the final customer 
that defines whether a product or service offers help to accomplish their desired purpose 
or goal. (Grönroos & Ravald, 2011:7) 
 
Consumers have requirements for services in the market, with the different relevant value 
expectations. Cultural and personal values, consumption values, as well as product 
benefits, are the factors that define the service values in the market. Cultural environments 
(incl. social and familial) impacts in formation and development of individual views, 
which are representing widely shared beliefs about desired outcome. Personal values are 
individuals’ beliefs of outcome desired for themselves, which are closely linked to needs. 
Consumption values refer to subjective beliefs about desired ways to achieve personal 
values or goals, through actions or activities, such as social interaction, economic 
exchange, and possession or consumption. In product benefits point of view, services are 
viewed as a bunch of benefits, not as attributes, which means that customers are less 
interested in the service’s technical features than in what benefits they get from buying, 
using or consuming the service. (Lai, 1995:381-388) 
 
2.1. Literature review 
 
The author and founder of RCM, John Moubray (1997), as well as Smith and Hinchcliffe 
(2004), discusses traditional RCM method and its benefits. Project report from Hoseinie 
and Kumar (2016) composed different point of view: the RCM method used in practice. 
Modified RCM can be used to minimize LCC or maximize availability by optimizing 
operating expenditures, discussed by Rausand & Vatn (2008). FTA is explained briefly 
by Penttinen & Lehtinen (2016). 
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Standards and guidelines that needs to be considered for enabling case company to get 
Approval of Service Supplier notation for RCM concept are: SAE International (2009) 
for standard SAE JA1011; Finnish Electrotechnical Standards Association (SFS) (2001) 
for standard IEC 60300-3-11; and DNV GL (2018) rules for classification in Maritime 
Services. Classification society ABS, included for having a comparison for DNV GL 
classification society, from Maritime reporter (2005) and Conachey & Montgomery 
(2003). 
 
A service business is concerned in the literature by Ylimäki & Vesalainen (2015) and 
Vargo & Lusch (2004), both papers discussing solution business. Servitization is a term 
for service-dominant and customer-focused type of business, which is explained by 
Rymaszewska, Helo & Gunasekaran (2017) and Vandermerwe & Rada (1988). As one 
can take a note, Vandermerwe and Rada have discussed servitization, how to add value 
by adding services, already in 1988. Analyzing maintenance needs and business to 
optimize operating expenditures is easier when assisted by big data knowledge of Russom 
(2011), and IoT literature of Yu, Liang, He, Hatcher, Lu, Lin & Yang (2018) and 
Wortmann & Flücher (2015). 
 
2.2. Solution business 
 
An interaction between the solution provider and a customer is vital (Ylimäki & 
Vesalainen, 2015:939). According to Ylimäki & Vesalainen (2015), continuous and 
seamless collaboration and knowledge-based communication are both in big roles when 
the customer co-produces value in the solution business. Approaches driven by service-
dominant (S-D) logic is facing some practical challenges, even its theoretical idea is 
promising (Vargo and Lusch, 2004:2). The idea of S-D logic is basically to focus in the 
service business, for example, specialized skills and knowledge, instead of traditional 
goods-dominant (G-D) logic of business (Vargo and Lusch, 2004:2). 
 
In the research of Ylimäki & Vesalainen (2015:939) some concerns about S-D logic is 
pondered if the service provider really understands their customers’ problems, and if the 
customers are capable of sufficiently expressing their needs. These concerns may be 
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solved in the co-creation of value propositions in the pre-activity phase (Ballantyne, 
Frow, Varey, & Payne, 2011:204), which consist of negotiation and development of a 
full-service maintenance concept (Ylimäki & Vesalainen, 2015:939-940). 
 
A value proposition is traditionally defined as a marketing offer or value promise that is 
formulated and communicated by a seller, with the intention of acceptation by a buyer 
(Ballantyne et al., 2011:203). This definition fits in G-D logic context, but the marketing 
and purchasing parts change when it comes to S-D logic where one-way communication 
gives way to mutual (reciprocal) or conversational (dialogical) communication in the 
cases where the parties are engaged by working and learning together purposefully 
(Ballantyne et al., 2011:203). Advisor and counselor McKinsey & Company explains the 
course of value propositions as following the segmented process (Figure 1.) (Lanning & 
Michaels, 1988): 
 
 
Figure 1. McKinsey & Co's value delivery system (Lanning & Michaels, 1988; 
Ballantyne et al., 2011:203) 
  
Communicate the value
Sales force message Sales promotion
Advertising, PR, etc. 
Message & Media
Provide the value
Product 
development
Service 
development
Pricing
Sourcing, 
making
Distributing, 
servicing
Choose the value
Customer value needs Value positioning
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2.3. Servitization 
 
Service-dominant and customer-focused movement is called a servitization of business 
(Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988). The servitization is a powerful feature of a total market 
strategy and it is leading to new relationships between solution provider and customer. 
Necessary enabler for servitization is digitalization, therefore during a transition from 
manufacturing to services, the organization need to develop and upgrade their digital tools 
simultaneously (Rymaszewska, Helo & Gunasekaran, 2017:93). Managers of the 
company must operate with the cumulative effects of servitization, which are caused by 
the combined results of past, current and future activities of human (Therivel & Ross, 
2007:366). These cumulative effects are changing the competitive dynamics. The key 
challenge is beneficially blend services into the overall strategies of the industrial 
companies (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988). 
 
Servitization brings lots of benefits to the company’s business activities. For example, in 
providers point of view the involvement in services provision, in addition to production, 
lock in the customer relationship with the provider. Alternatively, in customer’s point of 
view, servitization enhances the customer convenience of resolving issues and problems 
associated with products, when earlier the customer needed to solve the problems by 
themselves. The service establishment may also lead to an increase in the products life 
cycle. (Vandermerwe & Rada, 1988:92) 
 
Even though the servitization of industry is a powerful feature, according to Hojnik 
(2016) there are challenges that are crucial to the success of servitization projects. Some 
of the challenges are caused by EU law implications from the competition and consumer 
law perspective, but also servitization in cross-border trade (Hojnik, 2016:1575; 
European Commission, 2014:5). Following list (Figure 2.) clarifies benefits versus 
challenges arrangement, which are set by the EU law and policy: 
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Figure 2. Servitization benefits versus challenges set by EU law (Hojnik, 2016:1575; 
European Commission, 2014:5) 
 
2.4. Internet of Things (IoT) 
 
Maintenance process is much easier to plan and execute with adequate equipment, 
internet of things (IoT) assisted equipment is one of the possibilities to utilize. IoT is 
defined by McClelland (2019) as “a system of interrelated computing devices, mechanical 
and digital machines, objects, animals or people that are provided with unique identifiers 
and the ability to transfer data over a network without requiring human-to-human or 
human-to-computer interaction” (McClelland, 2019). Therefore, the internet of things 
(IoT) can enable possibilities of servitization for manufacturing companies 
(Rymaszewska et al., 2017:92). 
 
IoT provides an opportunity to access end-user operations and therefore building service-
products on data analytics (Rymaszewska et al., 2017:94). Following pyramid diagram 
(Figure 3.) illustrates the architecture of edge computing-based IoT in three layers: IoT 
Benefits
• Helping to cover the way for 
more innovative solutions
• Driving growth
• Horizontal in nature and aims at 
securing framework conditions 
favourable to industrial 
competitiveness
• Tendency for manufacturing 
firms to sell services and 
solutions, rather than products 
and goods
Challenges
• Preventing the negative 
implications of servitization for 
European society and economy
• Lack of clear regulation 
reducing competitiveness of the 
EU industry and functions as a 
barrier to growth
• Falls among policies where the 
EU has competence to carry out 
actions to support the actions of 
the Member States, which are 
the holders of their respective 
industrial policies
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devices, Edge Computing, and Cloud Computing. The base of the figure is IoT devices, 
which are all end-users for edge computing. In this type of architecture IoT can benefit 
from both edge computing and cloud computing, allowed by two characteristics of the 
structures (i.e. high computational capacity and large storage). (Yu, Liang, He, Hatcher, 
Lu, Lin & Yang, 2018) 
 
 
Figure 3. The three-layer architecture of edge computing-based IoT (Yu et al., 2018). 
 
The IoT is playing an important role in our daily lives, during the progressing 
development of information technology (Wortmann & Flücher, 2015:221). 
Interconnected sensors and devices can collect and exchange different data back and forth 
through modern communication network infrastructure, which is connected by millions 
of IoT nodes (Yu et al., 2018:6900). These sensors and devices cause massive amount of 
data, which, after being processed, provides intelligence to service providers, as well as 
for users. Using mainstream cloud computing requires that all data is uploaded to 
centralized servers, where after computation the results are sent back to the sensors and 
devices (Yu et al., 2018:6900; Wortmann & Flücher, 2015:222). This cycle-process 
creates pressure on the network, especially in the data transmission costs of bandwidth 
and resources (Yu et al., 2018:6900). Besides that, increased pressure is also making the 
• Reporting
• Long-term data analytics
• Long-term data storage
• Data infrastructure
• Enterprise integration
Cloud servers
• Data processing
• Real-time data analytics
• Real-time action response
• Temporary data storage
• Communication/messaging
Intelligent Gateway 
Edge Computing
• Data source
• Messaging
IoT Devices
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performance of the network worse, since the size of data has grown as well (Yu et al., 
2018:6900). 
 
The main three components that enable the IoT are: (1) hardware, which is a group of 
sensors, actuators, and fixed communication hardware; (2) middleware, which includes 
on-demand storing and computing tools for data analysis; (3) communication stack (i.e. 
presentation), which includes visualization and interpretation tools, is innovative and easy 
to use, and it can be extensively accessed; and (4) the secure data aggregation. (Gubbi, 
Buyya, Marusic & Palaniswami, 2013:1648) 
 
IoT can be divided into two main categories of identification: radio frequency 
identification (RFID), and wireless sensor networks (WSNs) (Gubbi et al., 2013:1648). 
IoT tools that enable the IoT process are typically categorized as (1) sensing; (2) 
communication (e.g. RFID systems, tags, and sensor networks); and (3) middleware, 
which is basically a software layer located between technological and application levels 
(Rymaszewska et al., 2017:94). Following hierarchy chart (Figure 4.) demonstrates the 
relations under IoT: 
 
 
Figure 4. Main components of the IoT (Rymaszewska et al., 2017:94; Gubbi et al., 2013) 
  
IoT
RFID WSN
Hardware Middleware
Communication 
stack
Secure data 
aggregation
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2.5. Big Data 
 
IoT is one adequate equipment to collect information for planning and executing the 
maintenance process, and the big data deals with the huge amount of collected transaction 
data (Gandomi & Haider, 2015:138). The data coming from IoT devices is handled with 
the Big Data Analytics (BDA). Big data allows isolating and tracking pertinent metrics 
to ensure that IoT devices are used in their full capability (Gandomi & Haider, 2015:138). 
Therefore, big data is also a part of effective maintenance planning and executing process. 
 
During recent years, big data has been defined in multiple various terms. An online survey 
collected the most relevant definitions of big data from 154 global executives in April 
2015. The results are presented in the International Journal of Information Management 
as follows (Gandomi & Haider, 2015:139): 
1. 28%: Massive growth of transaction data, including data from customers and the 
supply chain 
2. 24%: New technologies designed to address the 3 Vs (volume, variety, and 
velocity) challenges of big data 
3. 19%: Requirements to store and archive data for regulatory and compliance 
4. 18%: Explosion of new data sources such as social media, mobile device, or 
machine-generated devices 
5. 11%: Other definitions 
 
The significance of Big Data Analytics (BDA) by Philip Russom (2011:5):  
“Where advanced analytic techniques operate on big data sets. Big 
data is about two things – big data and analytics – plus how the two 
have teamed up to create one of the most profound trends in business 
intelligence (BI) today” (Russom, 2011:5) 
In recent years, advanced analytics has created a huge change in different industrial 
businesses. Analytics helps to discover what has changed and how to react. A scale of 
different business opportunities that should be seized is enormous. Advanced analytics 
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helps provider for discovering new customer segments, identifying new suppliers, 
associating products of affinity, understanding sales seasonality, etc. (Russom, 2011:5). 
 
Even the service provider should already have related experience in data warehousing, 
reporting, and online analytic processing (OLAP), since technical requirements are 
different for advanced forms of analytics. By choosing the correct form of advanced 
analytics and preparing big data for advanced analysis, users can make more intelligent 
decisions as they embrace analytics. Rephrasing the term advanced analytics as Russom 
(2011:5): it is a collection of related techniques and tool types. Typically, it includes 
predictive analytics such as data mining, statistical analysis, and complex SQL 
(Structured Query Language) (Harkins & Reid, 2002). It is possible to extend the list 
covering the data visualization, artificial intelligence, natural language processing, and 
database capabilities to support analytics. (Russom, 2011:4) 
 
A better term for advanced analytics would be “discovery analytics”. According to 
Russom (2011:5), BDA user is typically a business analyst who is trying to discover new 
business facts and information that no other analyst in the enterprise knew before. This is 
only possible with a large volume of data and a big amount of details. This data is often 
the one that the enterprise has not yet tapped for analytics. (Russom, 2011:5) 
 
The big data is not just about data volume. Certainly, the amount of data matters, but there 
are other important attributes of big data as well, such as data variety and data velocity. 
These three Vs (volume, variety, and velocity) establishes a comprehensive definition of 
the big data. For analytics, each of three Vs has its own ramifications as following Radial 
Venn (Figure 5.) visualizes (Russom, 2011:6): 
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Figure 5. The three Vs of big data (Russom, 2011) 
 
Even the data volume is the primary attribute of big data, it can also be analyzed by 
counting records, transactions, tables, or files. In addition, the scope of big data affects its 
quantification as well (Russom 2011:6; Michael & Miller, 2013:22). According to TDWI 
research by Russom (2011), collected data for general data warehousing differs from 
collected data specifically for analytics. Therefore, different analytic forms may have 
different datasets. 
 
The best outcome of using IoT is reached when big data is synchronized with analytics. 
Analytic tool results are enhanced with gigantic statistical samples provided by big data. 
Most of the tools are designed for data mining or statistical analysis, optimized for large 
datasets. The general rule by Russom (2011:9): 
The larger the data sample, the more accurate the statistics and other 
products of the analysis (Russom, 2011:9). 
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Cost of data storage and processing bandwidth are relatively affordable, even for the 
smaller companies (Russom, 2011:9). Therefore, tools and platforms for BDA are not 
anymore just for the biggest businesses. Small-to-midsize businesses that like to dig 
deeper into digital processes for sales, customer interactions, or supply chain, can also 
manage and control big data (Feijóo, Gómez-Barroso & Aggarwal, 2016). 
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3. MAINTENANCE MANAGEMENT 
 
Maintenance is considered as a blend of all technical, administrative and managerial 
actions during the life cycle of an item. Intention is to retain or restore the item to a state 
that it can perform the required function (BSI Standards Publication, 2010:5). 
Maintenance is defined in the Cambridge dictionary (cited 24.1.2019) as a work needed 
to keep a road, building, machine, etc. in good condition. 
 
Maintenance plays an important role in an effective engine. Small problems could be 
detected and corrected before they become a major problem, by carrying out short weekly 
inspections, lubricating, cleaning and performing some minor adjustments. Carelesness 
could lead to major problem, which can cause an engine failure. To achieve the 
company’s goals, maintenance should keep the systems functioning properly. This 
includes meeting the requirements of CRAMP parameters (Cost, Reliability, Availability, 
Maintainability, and Productivity) for any automated systems. Not only systems 
themselves need to be able to integrate the evaluations, but also their interactions with 
each other and their environment (Gustafson, Schunnesson, Galar & Kumar, 2013). 
 
For example, engines have a lot of moving components inside, and moving components 
cause erosion on its surface. By collecting data and analyzing further how and when the 
components of the engine need maintenance or to be changed, a risk for the complete 
failure decreases (Peshkin & Hoerner, 2004:4). Maintaining the engine also avoids costs 
of engines in poor condition that are low in efficiency or may face the quenching 
completely after an unexpected failure. In addition, timing and planned procedures take 
big roles in the process planning, therefore, maintenance process should be available 
when calculated (Peshkin & Hoerner, 2004:4). 
 
3.1. Preventive Maintenance 
 
Maintenance is divided into three main categories: corrective, predictive and preventive 
(Moubray, 1997:171). Corrective maintenance means overhauling items when they are 
found to be failing or after the item already failed, which is a reactive type of maintenance. 
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Corrective maintenance could be planned or unplanned (Moubray, 1997:171). Predictive 
tasks require checking if something is failing (Moubray, 1997:171). Preventive 
Maintenance (PM) is the target and core part of the RCM process, therefore PM will be 
explained comprehensively in this chapter. The traditional RCM process and its 
development are in the focus of this thesis. 
 
Preventive maintenance aims to prevent the failure, which means it is a proactive type of 
maintenance. Basically, PM means overhauling items or replacing components at fixed 
intervals (Moubray, 1997:171). There are three different preventive maintenance types 
performed: condition-based, scheduled failure-finding, and periodic overhauls. 
Condition-based is executed by making continuous measurements and periodic 
inspections. Periodic overhauls are managed by calendar time or operating time (Rausand 
& Vatn, 2008). Hierarchy chart (Figure 6.) clarifies these relations: 
 
Figure 6. Different types of maintenance (Davies, 1998:509-510; Rausand & Vatn, 
2008:79) 
 
Preventive maintenance itself is overall target and core part of RCM process (Moubray, 
1997:171). A key factor in the definition of PM is preplanning. In developing a proactive 
maintenance model and culture, preplanning (i.e. scheduling) has an important role. PM 
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is an equipment maintenance strategy that is based on replacing, overhauling or 
remanufacturing an item (Wang, 2002). The strategy is performed either by fixed or 
adaptive intervals, despite of its condition at the time. PM actions can be divided into 
categories: prevent (or mitigate) failure, detect an onset of failure, discover hidden failure, 
and do nothing – valid limitations. Identifying these four factors leads to the stage for 
defining the four task categories from which a PM action may be specified (Smith & 
Hinchliffe, 2004): 
1. Time-based maintenance (TBM) aims to prevention or retardation of failure. 
Preventive policy, in which precautionary maintenance actions are carried out at 
pre-specified time intervals, is the traditional time-based maintenance (TBM) or 
use based maintenance (UBM). Important things about time-directed task 
categorizing are: (1) preset periodicity of the task action, occurs without further 
input; (2) the action is recognized to directly provide failure prevention or 
retardation benefits; and (3) the task generally requires some form of intrusion 
into the equipment. For example, TBM/UBM may be used at once in a month –
type of maintenance, or after every 1000 running hours. (Pintelon & Van 
Puyvelde, 2006:97) 
2. Condition-based maintenance (CBM) aims to detect the failing component and its 
failure modes, in other words, detecting failures or failure symptoms (Veldman, 
Klingenberg, & Wortmann, 2011). PM is carried out whenever a given system 
parameter (i.e. system condition) reaches or approaches a predetermined value or 
situation. Important factors when classifying a CBM task is that the measurable 
parameter which correlates with failure onset is defined, as well as the value of a 
measurable parameter itself. CBM was initially limited to high-risk environments, 
such as aviation and nuclear power generation, now it is widely practiced. 
(Pintelon & Van Puyvelde, 2006:97) 
3. Failure-finding (FF) aims to discover a hidden failure before an operational 
request (Pintelon & Van Puyvelde, 2006:97). When the systems and facilities are 
large and complex, several equipment items or a whole system or subsystem 
might face some failure. In the normal course of operation, nobody would get to 
identify that such a failure occurred – this is called “hidden failure” (Narayan, 
2004:59). For example, a pump seal leaks in a normally unattended unit. Usually 
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there would be some evidence of the leak (pool of process liquid on the pump-
bed), but only because the operator was not present, and nobody saw it happening, 
the event from an evident to a hidden failure occurs. The leak would have been 
obvious if the operator was present, and any further actions would not be 
necessary. 
4. Run-to-failure (RTF) is a measured decision to run some component until the 
failure when the other options are not possible, failure event has no or only little 
consequence (Narayan, 2004:196), or the economics are less profitable (Nowlan 
& Heap, 1978; Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004). The item needs to fail before any 
maintenance work. By using the knowledge (e.g. big data) of RTF, it is possible 
to reduce the workload of preventive maintenance significantly. Narayan 
(2004:94) states that such unnecessary maintenance results in additional failure 
are often caused by poor materials or lack of employees’ skill level. Eliminating 
the unnecessary maintenance has an impact on decreasing early failures and 
eliminating some breakdown work as well. The equipment uptime or availability 
also rises consistently (Narayan, 2004:94). 
 
Even the PM is the core of the RCM process, sometimes it is impossible to apply PM in 
engineering assets in a few different reasons. For example, in the case such as: (1) if there 
is not any PM task found that would bring any value regardless of how much money the 
user might be able to spend; or (2) if the available and potential PM task is too expensive. 
This concern arises, when the item is less costly to fix when it fails, with no safety impact 
at issue in RTF decision. In addition, (3) the equipment failure should not occur since it 
is one the lowest on the priority list to warrant attention within the allocated PM budget. 
(Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:39-40) 
 
What if is necessary to create a new PM program or update an existing PM program? 
Essentially, the process would be the same. First, determining what the PM program 
would include and what to do with it (Kobbacy & Murthy, 2008). Using necessary steps 
to build an ideal program into infrastructure and set it to action. Following horizontal 
hierarchy chart (Figure 7.) illustrates the development of a preventive program (Smith & 
Hinchcliffe, 2004): 
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Figure 7. Preventive program development (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004). 
 
3.1.1. Condition Monitoring 
 
Maintenance related expectations have grown significantly over the past 70 years. 
Evolving from the reactive process to the preventive activity has an outstanding impact 
on savings of temporal and economical point of view. Maintenance framework RCM is a 
solution for preventive maintenance process, which includes the adoption of Condition 
Monitoring (CM) as one of the main segments. CM increases safety and availability in a 
cost-effective manner. (Knutsen, et al., 2014:4) 
 
There are different condition monitoring techniques. CM increases the safety level by 
reducing the risk of loss of life and property, as well as minimizes the costs of the 
component or system when being maintained timely (Knutsen, et al., 2014:4). In other 
words, reliability rate increases. These enchantments achieved by monitoring possible 
failure mechanisms, taking actions through operational measures in the short-term and 
through maintenance in the long-term, both supporting to avoid the development of a 
failure (Knutsen, et al., 2014:4). Therefore, CM leads to avoidance of a potential 
breakdown of the component or the system (Knutsen, et al., 2014:4). Following Radial 
Venn (Figure 8.) shows common condition monitoring techniques (Davies, 1998:304): 
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Figure 8. Condition monitoring techniques (Davies, 1998:304) 
 
Monitoring techniques explained (Davies, 1998:304-305) 
• Aural and visual: basic and the most common forms of surveying machine 
condition. It is commonly accepted that skilled personnel, with comprehend 
knowledge of machines, can identify a potential failure by simply listening to the 
sounds of distress emitted of a machine nearby. The aural technique can be 
assisted by stethoscope, or by placing a spanner or rod against the machine and 
using ear or earmuffs for listening. The visual inspection can be assisted by 
borescope or stroboscope, which are light assisted devices. 
• Operational variables: also considered as performance or duty-cycle monitoring. 
Focus is to assess each machine’s performance regarding its intended duty. Any 
major warnings from expected problem, or design values indicating signs of a 
problem existing, often relates to malfunction of the machine. 
• Temperature: measuring the operational and the component surface temperatures. 
Monitoring component temperatures is related to wear occurring in machine 
elements where lubrication is either inadequate or absent, particularly in journal 
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bearings. The technique can be assisted by optical pyrometers, thermocouples, 
thermography, and resistance thermometers. 
• Wear debris: generated of load-bearing machine elements moving surfaces. 
Possibility to assess the condition of these surfaces if the wear debris is collected 
and analyzed. Debris defined as a broken or torn piece of something larger 
(Cambridge Dictionary, cited 1.12.2018) 
• Vibration: the basic measurement of CM. The technique works by a wide 
selection of transducers, such as a piezoelectric accelerometer, which is a popular 
measurement transducer in use. Obtaining acceleration signals from transducers 
can be integrated to produce velocity or even displacement values for different 
applications. After processing these signals in alternative ways to highlight 
different aspects of the data, they can be used to detecting and diagnosing the 
machine condition. The various techniques can be divided under the categories as 
shown in following Diverging Radial chart (Figure 9.): 
 
Figure 9. Vibration monitoring techniques (Davies, 1998:306) 
 
Optimal sensor placement needs to be considered in condition monitoring. In condition 
monitoring process the sensors need to be placed optimally for efficient failure diagnosis. 
Vital metrics of sensor network optimization are the selection of the location, type, and 
number of sensors (Oskouei & Pourgol-Mohammad, 2016). 
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The sensor placement is not an easy task and it might face some challenges on the process. 
Representing a maritime region, the challenge is determining the least expensive 
configuration required to reach a given level of coverage in a fixed volume. The 
mentioned challenge is a planning problem where the aim is to develop a tool that can 
provide the decision maker, which includes every possible cost-coverage trade-off. 
(Ngatchou, Fox & El-Sharkawi, 2006:2714) 
 
Given a set of transmitters (𝑆𝑇𝑥) and a set of receivers (𝑆𝑅𝑥), the cost objective is a 
weighted sum of the number of sensors. The weights are basically the respective costs of 
the sensors. In this case, all given type sensors have the same cost for transmitters (𝐶𝑇𝑥) 
and for receivers (𝐶𝑅𝑥). This cost objective element can be formulated as (Ngatchou, et 
al., 2006:2714): 
𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡 =  𝐶𝑇𝑥𝑁𝑇𝑥 + 𝐶𝑅𝑥𝑁𝑅𝑥 
In this formula, 𝑁𝑇𝑥and 𝑁𝑅𝑥 are the number of transmitters and the number of receivers 
respectively. Generally, the receivers are cheaper than the transmitters (𝐶𝑇𝑥>𝐶𝑅𝑥). 
Limitations on the cost objective are only the maximum number of transmitters and 
receivers (Ngatchou, et al., 2006:2714): 
1 ≤ 𝑁𝑇𝑥 ≤ 𝑁𝑇𝑥𝑀𝑎𝑥 and 1 ≤ 𝑁𝑅𝑥  ≤ 𝑁𝑅𝑥𝑀𝑎𝑥 
 
In the sensor networks optimization process, determining logical relationships between 
components and sub-systems is performed through altered methods, such as FMEA, FTA, 
and RBD (Reliability Block Diagram). Potential sensor locations are first determined 
through Sensor Placement Index (SPI), which depends on the importance of the failure 
modes, as well as the cost monitoring processes of failure modes. Potential places of 
sensors result different scenarios for sensor placement. (Oskouei & Pourgol-Mohammad, 
2016) 
 
Following process flow chart (Figure 10.) describes further how the sensor placement 
structure is managed step by step (Oskouei & Pourgol-Mohammad, 2016:85): 
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Figure 10. Sensor placement methodology structure (Oskouei & Pourgol-Mohammad, 
2016:85) 
 
3.2. RAMS 
 
Reliability, availability, maintainability, and safety (RAMS) are generic essential risk 
related system quality attributes (Stapelberg, 2009:3; Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:473). 
Generic attributes that can be used for all types of risk management irrespective of the 
item type considered. Defining an item as part, component, device, subsystem, functional 
unit, equipment, or individually described and considered item for the system. The term 
RAMS consists of dependability (RAM) and safety (S). (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:473) 
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The system risk can be divided into availability and safety risks. Availability risks of the 
system are formed by the combination of probabilities and consequences of dependability 
related risk sources. Likewise, safety risks are formed by the combination of probabilities 
and consequences of hazards. The following block chart (Figure 11.) illustrates the terms 
of risk and RAMS (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:474): 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. The terms of risk and RAMS (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:474). 
 
3.3. DNV GL – Rules for classification 
 
Roots stretch all the way back to 1864 when Norway’s mutual marine insurance clubs 
together established a set of rules and procedures, which were used in assessing the risk 
of underwriting individual vessels. Norwegian group Det Norske Veritas (DNV), founded 
as a membership organization, aimed to provide reliable classification and taxation of 
Norwegian ships. DNV became operational company after merging with Germanischer 
Lloyd (GL) in September 2013.  
 
DNV GL Group is today a globally leading quality assurance and risk management 
company. Operating in over 100 countries with more than 100,000 customers across the 
maritime, oil and gas, energy, food, and healthcare industries, and a variety of other 
sectors. DNV GL states to help companies to become safer, smarter and greener. 
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(dnvgl.com – about DNV GL, 2018). It is an organization with the objective of 
safeguarding life, property, and the environment. Operating through a limited company 
(Ltd.) DNV GL AS, which is registered in Norway, and through a worldwide network of 
affiliates and offices. (DNVGL-RU-SHIP, 2018) 
 
DNV GL carries out classification, certification and other verification services related to 
ships, systems, facilities, materials and components, and performs research in connection 
with these functions. DNV GL might perform assignments that utilize its knowledge or 
contribute to developing knowledge that is required for the performance of these tasks. 
In addition, providing its integrity is not impaired. (DNVGL-RU-SHIP, 2018:7) 
 
With DNV GL approval of services supplier, the supplier can build trust and confidence 
with its customer. Service companies benefit from smart approval processes by following 
proven programs: DNV GL proof of quality leading to new market opportunities; boosted 
trust between shipping companies, operators and the supplier due to DNV GL 
certification; expert guidance on requirements and how to achieve compliance; as well as 
listing of approved service suppliers in DNV GL database, so that potential customers 
can easily find the supplier. (DNV GL, 2018) 
 
Nevertheless, suppliers delivering services relevant to ship operators or the classification 
of ships need to fulfill specific requirements. When serving DNV GL ships, these 
requirements are subject to approval. Experts of DNV GL approve the service supply 
business according to DNV GL rules, which guarantees that the supplier company meets 
common qualification, capability, and delivery requirements. The following list of 
services (Figure 12.) include all that DNV GL offers as approval for suppliers (DNV GL, 
2018): 
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Figure 12. List of DNV GL approval for supplier services (DNV GL, 2018) 
 
Certification by an authoritative third party, such as classification society DNV GL, is a 
value-adding validation. Following chart of relations (Figure 13.) explains how the DNV 
Certification represents a value-adding validation in the CMC process. CMC signifies 
Certification of Materials and Components and it is third-party certification. 
DNV GL services: Approval for suppliers
• Ultrasonic thickness measurements of ship structures
• Non-destructive testing for offshore projects/units
• Ultrasonic tightness testing of hatches
• In-water survey of ships
• Survey and maintenance of fire extinguishing equipment and breathing apparatus
• Service of radio communication equipment
• Service of inflatable life rafts, inflatable life jackets, evacuation systems and more
• Service of gas welding and cutting equipment on board
• Examination of Ro-Ro ship bow, stern, side and inner doors
• Survey of low location-lighting systems using photo-luminescent materials
• Sound-pressure level measurements of alarm systems
• Service and testing of voyage data recorder
• Resign casting of chock foundations, stern tubes, etc.
• Vibration monitoring and diagnostics of machinery on board ships
• Inspection and testing of navigational equipment and systems on board ships
• Inspection and testing of Inventory list of Hazardous Materials (IHM)
• Renewal survey examination of mooring chain intended for mobile offshore units
• Testing of coating systems (IMO PSPC)
• Servicing of lifeboats, launching appliances and on-load release gear
• Condition monitoring of machinery onboard ships and mobile offshore units
• Testing of ballast water management systems - environmental testing
• Testing of ballast water management systems - land-based and shipboard testing
• Services in terms of guidelines for compliance with MLC 2006 noise and vibration 
requirements
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Figure 13. DNV Certification is a value-adding validation (Marsh, 2010) 
 
Principles of marine operations consist of general information, verification services, 
approval services, and warranty surveys (Det Norske Veritas, 2010): 
- General: During the phases of design, construction, and operations, the 
verification may cover the marine operations phase, which includes transit and 
installation, depending on an agreement with the customer. 
- Verification services: Independent third-party verification services of marine 
operations or operation-parts. Depending on the agreed scope, it may involve 
elements such as independent reviews, analysis, inspection, and surveys. 
- Approval services and warranty surveys: During the issuance of a Marine 
Operation Declaration, DNV may confirm acceptability of the object under 
consideration, equipment, planning, and preparation. Confirming the compliance 
is executed by reviewing of analysis, strength calculations, equipment certificates, 
verification statements, plans and procedures, test programs, and personnel 
qualifications. 
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All work performed by DNV is based on three DNV rules for planning and execution of 
marine operations: The first rule includes delivering needed information and instructions 
to users, as well as the systematic and alphabetic indexes; the second rule specifies the 
general knowledge of operational and technical basis that are common for all types of 
marine operations; and the third rule defines specific requirements and guidance for 
various types of operations, e.g. load-out, lifting, transportation, offshore installation, 
sub-sea installations, location approvals, etc. 
 
The most relevant sections from “DNV Rules for Planning and Execution of Marine 
Operations” for an offshore gas terminal are planning of operations, design loads, 
structural design, towing, and special sea transports. Mentioned aspects assessed with 
respect to marine operations would typically include structural strength ballast systems 
and equipment, commissioning of ballast system, stability, minimum bollard pulling tug 
requirements, number and size of tugs required, towing arrangement and equipment, soil, 
grouting, operational procedures, and weather restrictions (Det Norske Veritas, 2010). 
 
Used structural typologies in offshore power generation mostly depend on the bearing 
capacity of the foundation, depth of the sea and wave conditions, the impact of the 
landscape, and features of the offshore wind farm (Escobar, López-Gutiérrez, Esteban & 
Negro, 2018:931). Subject to these input data is Gravity Base Structures (GBS), or other 
types of structures, which are robust and constitute a solid substructure for the topsides 
(Tistel, Eiksund, NTNU, Kvaerner, Bye & Athanasiu, 2015). GBS design is used to ease 
decision-making processes (Escobar, et al., 2018:931). GBS works by applying different 
calculation schemes in the two different hydrodynamic domains: according to Morison’s 
fluid dynamics equation theory D/L<0.20; and to diffraction theory D/L>0.20 (Escobar, 
et al., 2018:931; Morison, O’Brian, Johnson & Schaaf, 1950), where the variable D stands 
for drag force, which is proportional to the square of the instantaneous flow velocity, and 
variable L stands for inertia force, which is in phase with the local flow acceleration 
(Samui, Chakraborty & Kim, 2017:130). 
 
Typically the most critical aspects for a GBS gas terminal are (1) out of dock operation; 
(2) LNG storage tanks installation in the GBS base; (3) towing of GBS from construction 
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site to deck mating site; (4) mooring of GBS during completing the work (needs to stand 
the loads of environment e.g. wind, waves and current); (5) mating of GBS and topside; 
(6) towing of the completed GBS platform to the installation site; and (7) installation of 
the platform on the seabed (positioning requirements and arrangements, soil behavior, 
etc.). (Det Norske Veritas, 2010) 
 
Renewal of the certificate is good to perform in intervals, at least in every third year. 
Renewal is made by verification through audits that approved conditions are maintained 
or on expiry of the supplier’s approval received from an equipment manufacturer, 
depending of which comes first. When the renewal is not made in time, the DNV GL 
Society will be informed by the service supplier. (DNV GL AS, 2018) 
 
3.4. ABS SafeShip 
 
American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) is comparable classification society for DNV GL. 
ABS SafeShip is a program designed to apply advanced technology to reduce risk in the 
design, construction, and maintenance of a new and safer generation of cost-efficient 
vessels. ABS SafeShip helps providing a method of collecting information, early in the 
initial design and drawings phase, and then applying the most advanced, dynamic based 
assessment of the hull structure at any time throughout the vessel's life (Maritime 
Reporter, 2003). 
 
RCM is a process for systematically analyzing an engineered system to determine the 
following information (Conachey & Montgomery, 2003:39): 
- System functions and impact of functional failures 
- Equipment failure modes and causes that can result in functional failures 
- An optimal strategy for managing potential failures, which includes the 
maintenance to prevent the failures from occurring or to detect potential failures 
before they occurred 
- Spare parts holding requirements 
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ABS SafeShip RCM analysis process consists of five basic elements: (1) define systems; 
(2) identify functions and functional failures; (3) conduct a Failure Modes, Effects, and 
Criticality Analysis (FMECA); (4) select a failure management strategy; and (5) 
document the analysis (Conachey & Montgomery, 2003:41)  
37 
 
4. RELIABILITY-CENTERED MAINTENANCE (RCM) 
 
Total Productive Maintenance (TPM) and Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) are 
two methods for maintenance strategy planning. TPM is a strategy for improving 
productivity through improved maintenance practices, which include functions for 
maintaining plant and equipment. In comparison, RCM has a primary objective to 
preserve system function. Consequently, critical systems and equipment need to be 
inspected and tested regularly to confirm preservation. Reviewing and combining both 
methods in planning the maintenance program can potentially lead to better processes, 
improved teamwork and production output, as well as cut costs. (Ahuja & Khamba, 
2008:724; PdMA, 2014) 
 
TPM method, developed in Japan, is an approach to maintenance management that 
focuses on six major losses (Ahuja & Khamba, 2008:724): 
1. Breakdown losses 
2. Setup and adjustment losses 
3. Idling and minor stoppages 
4. Reduced speed losses 
5. Defects in the process and reworking losses 
6. Yield losses 
These six losses determine the effectiveness of the overall equipment. This effectiveness 
is an indicator of how machines, production lines, and processes perform when it comes 
to availability, quality and performance (Rausand, 2004). This thesis will focus on RCM, 
therefore TPM is explained only shortly. 
 
RCM is a systematic process integrating Preventive Maintenance (PM), Predictive 
Testing and Inspection (PT&I), reactive maintenance, and proactive maintenance to better 
probability that a machine or component will function in the required way over its planned 
life cycle with a minimum amount of maintenance and downtime. This approach aims to 
reduce the Life Cycle Cost (LCC) of an installation to a minimum while allowing the 
installation to function as intended, meeting the required levels of reliability and 
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availability. The basic steps of the RCM process are defined in following continuous 
block process (Figure 14.) (Moubray, 1997): 
 
Figure 14. The basic steps of the RCM process (Moubray, 1997) 
 
4.1. Definition and history 
 
Maintenance process has changed over the years in terms of increased complexity of 
systems and developed maintenance techniques. RCM is a result of the process evolving 
as a reliable method for maintenance planning. RCM method is in use to control planning 
and executing maintenance process (J. Moubray, 1997:1). The RCM method is defined 
by Rausand and Vatn (2008:79) as: 
“A systematic approach for identifying effective and efficient 
preventive maintenance tasks for items in accordance with a specific 
set of procedures and for establishing intervals between maintenance 
tasks”. (Rausand & Vatn, 2008:79) 
Origins of the RCM are in the aircraft industry in the 1960’s. By the late 1950s, the cost 
of maintenance activities in this industry became high enough to permit a special 
investigation of the effectiveness. Henceforth, a task force formed consisting of 
representatives of the airlines and the FAA (Federal Aviation Administration) to 
investigate the capabilities of PM in the 1960s. Foundings of the task force led to the 
development of a series of guidelines for aircraft manufacturers to use. (NASA, 2000) 
 
1. Initiation 
and planning
2. Functional 
failure 
analysis
3. Task 
selection
4. 
Implementation
5. Continuous 
improvement
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In 1974, the US Department of Defense commissioned United Airlines to make a report 
of the used processes in the civil aviation industry, which to help the development of 
maintenance programs for aircraft (Mainsaver, 2018:1-2). Authors Stan Nowlan and 
Howard Heap published the report in 1978, entitled Reliability Maintenance, which 
became the report that all subsequent RCM approaches have been based on. Mr's Nowlan 
and Heap found many types of failures, which some of them could not be prevented even 
maintenance activities are as intensive as possible (Nowlan & Heap, 1978:3-4; 
Mainsaver, 2018:2-3). 
 
It was also discovered that for multiple items the chance of failure did not increase with 
age (Nowlan & Heap, 1978:43-44). Consequently, a maintenance program based on age 
will have little, if any effect on the failure rate with the age-reliability patterns (NASA, 
2000). This will be further explained in the chapter 4.4.7 especially with figure 25. Later 
RCM adjusted to several other industries and military branches (Rausand & Vatn, 
2008:80). Maintenance generations are defined and explained in the following block 
process (Figure 15.) by Moubray (1997:1-3): 
 
Figure 15. Maintenance generations illustration by Moubray (1997:1-3) 
 
First generation
Early 1950's and 
before (Before 
World War II)
• Fix it when breaks
• Easier machines to repair
• Low dependency
Second generation
1950's to mid-70's
• More complex machines
• More dependencies
• More focus on downtime
• Increased costs of maintenance
Third generation
1975-
• New expectations
• New research
• New techniques
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Through the ages, the method of RCM has developed, and there exist several theories 
about RCM. Common aim for the different theories is to develop optimized maintenance 
strategy and plan (Moubray, 1997:33). Creating a maintenance strategy reduces costs, 
and the focus is on maintaining the functions of the systems or assets (Moubray, 
1997:312). 
 
4.2. Standards 
 
There are different types of maintenance standards, which are intended for different 
purposes. It appears that there are almost as many product and process variations as there 
are individual structures (Marsh, 2010:19). Therefore, formulating industry standards and 
qualification routes could be difficult. However, in this thesis, the focus is on the 
following standards and guidelines, since the original documents need to be presented for 
officials when the maintenance process is executed in other ways than in manual that is 
following official standards and guidelines. There are two standards that are most 
commonly followed when executing the RCM process: IEC 60300-3-11 and SAE 
JA1011. 
 
4.2.1. IEC 60300-3-11 
 
IEC 60300-3-11:2009 for dependability management. This standard is an application 
guide for the development of failure management policies for equipment and structures 
using RCM analysis techniques (NSAI Standards, 2009). IEC 60300-3-11 is an extension 
of standards IEC 60300-3-10, IEC 60300-3-12 and IEC 60300-3-14. Maintenance 
activities are recommended to follow all three standards, which relate to PM and could 
be implemented using IEC 60300-3-11 standard. The standard is limited to the application 
of RCM techniques, and it does not include maintenance support aspects, which are 
covered by standards mentioned above or other dependability and safety standards. 
(Finnish Electrotechnical Standards Association (SFS), 2001:46) 
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According to standard IEC 60300-3-11, normative structures of maintenance program 
development trails the following instructions (Finnish Electrotechnical Standards 
Association (SFS), 2001:47): 
- Structures are classified into one of two categories, depending on the 
consequences of their failure on safety: Primary category includes a structurally 
significant item (SSI) that has any detail, element or assembly, which contributes 
significantly to carry operating, aerodynamic, gravity, ground, hydrodynamic, 
pressure or control loads, and whose failure could affect the safety critical 
structure of the equipment and structures; secondary category is another structure, 
which is judged not to be a structurally significant item. Both defined externally 
and internally within specified zonal boundaries. 
- The aim for the maintenance of the scheduled structures is dependent on the 
design philosophy of the member being analyzed: safe life or damage-tolerant. 
The principal objective for a safe life structural member is to prevent the first 
failure. The principal objective for a damage-tolerant member is to detect incipient 
failures. SSIs are always safety critical because the major load-carrying element 
failures will have a direct disadvantageous on safety. A separate logic is followed 
for SSIs. Therefore, this logic identifies structural inspection requirements, based 
on whether the SSI design philosophy is safe life or damage-tolerant. 
 
Safe life structural members have a safe usable life. A single failure with this type of 
structure can be catastrophic. Safety is achieved in two ways: by building the structure 
with a large margin of strength above the expected loads; or by limiting the structure 
usage to a “safe life”, which is less than the time it was tested in the laboratory. A failure 
symptom cannot be detected, e.g. the crack propagation rate is too fast to allow for 
multiple inspections before failure. For these reasons, safe life structural members are 
replaced or modified before the age that failures are expected to occur. (Finnish 
Electrotechnical Standards Association (SFS), 2001:47) 
 
The damage-tolerant design concept requires the following two rules, which are needed 
to take into account: (1) Fail safe – when one or more elements crack or fail completely, 
the rest of the structure should be capable of withstanding a given static load; and (2) 
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Slow crack growth – the rate at which a fatigue crack in an element grows should be slow 
enough to give a sufficient period of time for detection before it reaches a critical crack 
length. After a single primary structural failure, the equipment should withstand 80% of 
its design loading without catastrophic failure. Reliability for a damage-tolerant structure 
is achieved by (1) using multiple paths, safety assured by preserving the capability of load 
carrying through redundancy; (2) choosing materials that exhibit slow crack growth, 
safety assured by the ability for inspecting and discovering damage before complete 
failure; and (3) using a crack-arresting design, cracks are inhibited from reaching a critical 
size. (Finnish Electrotechnical Standards Association (SFS), 2001:49) 
 
The assessment of structure should consider the following damage sources (Figure 16.) 
for the selection of maintenance tasks. Damage sources are divided into three different 
categories: Accidental and fatigue damages, and environmental deterioration. 
 
Figure 16. Damage sources of structures in maintenance program development (Finnish 
Electrotechnical Standards Association (SFS), 2001:49) 
 
Damage sources
Accidental damage (AD)
• Random discrete event
• Can reduce the inherent 
level of residual strength
• Sources of such damage 
can include:
• Maintenance and 
servicing equipment
• Erosion from rain, hail, 
lightning etc.
• Debris
• Human error during 
equipment 
manufacturing, 
operation or 
maintenance
Environmental 
deterioration (ED)
• Structural deterioration 
caused by an adverse 
environment
• Assesments required to 
cover corrosion, stress 
corrosion and 
deterioration of non-
metallic materials
• Corrosion can be result 
from a breakdown with 
age or randomly occuring 
discrete event - can or 
cannot be time or usage 
dependent
• Stress corrosion cracking 
primarly caused by heat 
treatment, forming, 
welding, machining, 
installation, fit up or 
misalignment
Fatigue damage (FD)
• Initiation of a crack or 
cracks due to cyclic 
loading and subsequent 
propagation
• Cumulative process with 
respect to equipment 
operating hours or cycles
• May be affected by 
irradiation
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Structural inspection program procedure consists of 21 different factos (from “a” to “u”), 
described by a series of process steps (P1, P2, P3, etc.) and decision steps (D1, D2, D3, 
etc.) as follows (Finnish Electrotechnical Standards Association (SFS), 2001:51-53): 
a. The structural maintenance program includes all equipment structure. (P1) The 
designer subdivides them into items. 
b. (D1) The designer categorizes each item as a (P2) SSI or (P3) other structure, 
using the basis of the consequences of item failure or malfunction on equipment 
safety. 
c. (P3) Comparing items, which are categorized as other structure, (D2) to similar 
structural items on existing equipment and structure. (P4) Developing 
maintenance recommendations with the knowledge of personnel that has 
operating experience and good judgment, together with accurate data for similar 
items. Also considering (P5) designer’s advice for the items that are not similar to 
others (e.g. new materials and design concepts). (P4) All selected tasks are 
included in the (P8) preliminary maintenance plan. 
d. Repeating the steps “a” to “c” until all structural items are categorized. 
e. (P6) Determining inspection requirements for timely detection of AD or ED for 
all SSIs. These are all divided as individual SSIs or SSI-groups, which are each 
suitable for comparative assessments based on their location, inspection access, 
boundaries, analysis breakdown, etc. 
f. (P7) Determining inspection requirements with the designer’s rating systems to 
assure timely detection of AD, corrosion and stress corrosion, for all SSIs.  
g. Including all selected inspection tasks to (P8) preliminary maintenance plan. 
h. Requirements for assuring timely detection or prevention of FD to all SSIs are 
also determined by using the Logic Tree Analysis (LTA). This step is the 
beginning of the third decision (D3). 
i. (D3) Categorizing each SSI as damage-tolerant or safe life by the designer. 
j. (P9) The designer determines the safe life limit for all the items categorized as 
safe life, with a description of the SSI, in the equipment safe operation limitations 
manual. (P10) Scheduled fatigue related inspection program is not required to 
assure continuous safe operations. 
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k. (P11) Remaining SSIs are damage tolerant. (D4) The designer determines if 
timely detection of fatigue damage is dependent on scheduled inspections. 
l. (P12, P10) SSI design does not require a scheduled fatigue related inspection 
program to carry the required load with the damage that will be readily detectable 
during routine operation of the equipment or is indicated by a safe function failure. 
m. The scheduled inspection program is required for the remaining SSIs, to assure 
timely detection of FD. (D5) Determination, if scheduled fatigue related SSI 
inspections are required, is estimated by the designer. 
n. (D6, D7) Proper inspection tasks are determined when scheduled fatigue related 
inspections are required, e.g. can FD be detected by (D6) visual inspections or by 
(D7) Non-Destructive Inspection (NDI) at practical intervals. Tasks are generally 
based on the designer’s damage tolerance evaluation, where the timing and order 
for determining the fatigue inspection tasks will mainly depend on the availability 
of the required technical data. In some industries, by industry-wide steering 
committees and appropriate regulatory authorities, the schedule for completing 
the FD detection evaluations may be subject to approval. 
o. (D6) Providing the necessary fatigue damage detection opportunities are 
performed, when applicable and effective, by visual inspections during proper 
scheduled maintenance checks. 
p. (D7) In addition, providing necessary fatigue damage detection opportunities 
when visual inspections are inadequate during proper scheduled maintenance 
checks, applicable NDI methods are used. 
q. (P13) If practical and effective visual and/or NDIs are not available, improved 
inspection access and/or SSIs redesign could be required. The SSI should be 
categorized as safe life if the designer does not find this action feasible. 
r. (D8) Together with accurate data, knowledgeable personnel use good judgment 
and operating experience to review the details of the fatigue inspection 
requirements to determine if the details are feasible. D8 procedure in P13 is used 
if visual inspection and/or NDI is not feasible. 
s. (P8) The preliminary maintenance plan includes selected fatigue inspection 
requirements. 
t. The FD analysis procedure is repeated for all SSIs 
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u. (P14) Inspection tasks from AD, ED and FD analyses are overlaid and 
consolidated. Reviewing, approving and including the resulting inspection 
requirements for all SSIs and the maintenance tasks for other structure in the 
maintenance program proposal. 
 
4.2.2. SAE JA1011 
 
Society of Automotive Engineers, SAE International, is a classification society that has 
created a standard JA1011, which consist of evaluation criteria for RCM processes. This 
SAE standard for RCM is intended for use by any organization that has or makes use of 
physical assets or systems, which the organization wishes to manage responsibly (SAE 
international, 2009). 
 
Standard JA1011 contains requirements for a process, to be called as RCM process. These 
requirements can be summarized in the following seven questions that need to be 
answered satisfactorily to reach the RCM process title (SAE international, 2009): 
1. What are the functions and associated desired standards of the asset’s performance 
in its present operating context (functions)? 
2. What ways the asset’s performance can fail to fulfill its functions (functional 
failures)? 
3. What causes each functional failure (failure modes)? 
4. What happens when failures occur (failure effects)? 
5. What way does the each of the failures matter (failure consequences)? 
6. What should be done to predict or prevent each functional failure (proactive tasks, 
task intervals)? 
7. What should be done if a suitable proactive task cannot be found (default actions)? 
 
SAE JA1011 addresses specifics for every one of these seven basic questions. Answers 
for the previous questions (SAE international, 2009): 
1. The operating context of the asset need to be defined, all the functions of the 
system need to be identified (incl. primary and secondary), all function statements 
needs to contain a verb, an object, and a performance standard, and performance 
46 
 
standards in function statements needs to be on the level of performance desired 
by the owner or user of the system in its operating context.  
2. With the functional failures, all the failed states associated with each function need 
to be identified. 
3. All failure modes reasonably likely to cause each functional failure should be 
identified. The method is used to decide what constitutes a “reasonably likely” 
failure mode should be acceptable to the owner or user of the asset. Also, the 
failure modes have to be identified at a level of causation, which makes it possible 
to identify an appropriate failure management policy. In addition, the lists of 
failure modes need to include failure modes that have (1) happened before; are (2) 
being prevented by existing maintenance programs currently; and those that (3) 
have not yet happened but that are thought to be reasonably likely in the operating 
context. Any event or process that is likely to cause a functional failure, including 
deterioration, design defects, and human error whether caused by operators or 
maintainers, except a human error is addressed by analytical processes apart from 
RCM, should also include in the lists of failure modes. 
4. Failure effects should describe what would happen if no specific task is executed 
to anticipate, prevent, or detect the failure. Failure effects includes all the needed 
information to support the evaluation of consequences of the failure, such as: (1) 
evidence (if any) that the failure occurred (if hidden functions – what happens 
when multiple failures occurred); (2) what it does (if anything) to injure or even 
kill someone, or to have an adverse effect on the environment; (3) what it does (if 
anything) to have an adverse effect on production or operations; (4) physical 
damage (if any) is caused by the failure; what must be done (if anything) to restore 
the function of the system after the failure. 
5. The consequences of every failure mode should be formally categorized, where 
the categorization process separates hidden failure from evident failure modes. 
The consequence categorization process should clearly distinguish events that 
have safety and/or environmental consequences from those that only have 
economic consequences (operation and non-operational). The assessment of 
failure consequences should be carried out as if no specific task is currently being 
done to anticipate, prevent, or detect the failure. 
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6. The failure management selection process should consider that the conditional 
probability of some failure modes will increase with age, or exposure to stress, for 
others the conditional probability will not change, or it could even decrease with 
age. All scheduled tasks should be technically feasible and worth doing (i.e. 
applicable and effective). How this requirement will be satisfied is set out in the 
next (7th) paragraph. When there are more than two proposed failure management 
policies that are applicable and effective, the most cost-effective policy is going 
to be selected. The selection of failure management policies should be carried out 
as if no specific task is under work to anticipate, prevent or detect the failure. 
7. Failure management policies for all scheduled tasks should comply with the 
following criteria. In the case of (1) an evident failure mode that has safety or 
environmental consequences, the task reduces the probability of the failure mode 
to a level that is tolerable to the owner or user of the asset; (2) a hidden failure 
mode where the associated multiple failures have safety or environmental 
consequences and the task reduces the probability of the hidden failure mode to 
an extent, which reduces the probability of the associated multiple failure to a 
level that is tolerable to the owner or user of the asset; (3) an evident failure mode 
that does not have safety or environmental consequences, the direct and indirect 
costs of doing the task should be less than the direct and indirect costs of the 
failure mode when measured over comparable periods of time; (4) a hidden failure 
mode where the associated multiple failures does not have safety or environmental 
consequences, the direct and indirect costs of doing the task should be less than 
the direct and indirect costs of the multiple failure with the cost of repairing the 
hidden failure mode when measured over comparable periods of time. 
 
On-condition tasks are defined in the standard SAE JA1011. Any on-condition, 
predictive, condition-based or condition monitoring task that is selected should meet with 
additional criteria, such as: (1) existing a clearly defined potential failure; (2) existing an 
identifiable P-F interval (potential-to-functional failure) or failure development period; 
(3) the task interval should be less than the shortest likely P-F interval; (4) it should be 
physically possible to do the task at intervals less than the P-F interval; and also (5) the 
shortest time between the discovery of a potential failure and the occurrence of the 
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functional failure (the P-F interval without the task interval) should be long enough for 
predetermined action to be taken to avoid, eliminate, or minimize the consequences of 
the failure mode. In addition, scheduled discard tasks, scheduled restoration tasks, and 
failure-finding tasks are handled in the JA1011 standards in the on-condition task list. 
(SAE international, 2009) 
 
JA1011 standard also deals with failure management policies – One-time changes and 
RTF policies. SAE JA1011 is considered as a living program since the standard 
recognizes that “a lot of the data used in the initial analysis are inherently imprecise and 
that more precise data will become available in time”. It also states that “the way in which 
the asset is used, together with associated performance expectations, will also change 
with time, and that the maintenance technology continues to evolve”. Any of the used 
mathematical and statistical formulae in the application of the process should be logically 
robust, available and approved by the owner (or user) of the asset. (SAE international, 
2009) 
 
4.3. RCM principles 
 
There are four main principles known as pillars for RCM philosophy (Smith & 
Hinchcliffe, 2004:66-69). Any maintenance analysis process to be labeled RCM must 
contain all the following four pillars: 
1. Preserve system function. The most important feature of RCM. Enables user to 
systematically decide what equipment relates to what functions in later stages of 
the process. Every item of equipment is not equally important. Answers to the 
questions: what to maintain and how to do it? (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004:67). 
2. Identify failure modes that can defeat the functions. Functional failures are 
different sizes and shapes, and it is not always simple to know if there is a failure 
or not. Answers to the question: which specific failure modes in the hardware 
could potentially produce the unwanted functional failures? (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 
2004:67). 
3. Prioritize function need via failure modes. All functions are not created equal, 
which means all functional failures and their related components and failure 
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modes are not created equal. Preparing a plan for carrying out the identified 
maintenance tasks at optimal intervals and evaluating all the founded tasks with 
cost-benefit analysis (CBA) helps to prioritize. Timing is important in the efficient 
process (Rausand & Vatn, 2008:80). Answers to the question: what priority 
customer wishes to assign in allocating budgets and resources? (Smith & 
Hinchcliffe, 2004:68). 
4. Select appropriate and effective PM tasks for high priority failure modes. An 
outcome of first three RCM pillars formulates a systematic road map which 
illustrates where (component), what (failure mode), and the priority that is used 
to proceed to establish specific PM tasks. All the potential PM tasks in the RCM 
process need to be judged as appropriate and effective. (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 
2004:68-69). 
 
Major advantages of the RCM analysis are a traceable and structured approach to 
determine the optimal type of preventive maintenance (PM). Optimal PM achieved 
through a detailed analysis of failure modes and failure causes. Although the main 
objective of RCM is to determine PM, the results from the analysis can also be used in 
relation to corrective maintenance strategies, spare part optimization, and logistic 
consideration. RCM also has a vital role in overall system safety management. (Rausand 
& Vatn, 2008:79; Moubray, 1997:102). 
 
Moubray (1997:102) states that the RCM process stipulates if failure could affect safety 
or the environment, and therefore it needs to be prevented. Failure modes that have safety 
or environmental consequences are only worth doing a proactive task if it reduces the 
probability of the failure to a tolerably low level (Moubray, 1997:102). When properly 
conducted, the RCM analysis process should answer the following seven questions 
(Rausand & Vatn, 2008:79-80; Moubray, 1997:7): 
1. What are the system functions and the associated performance standards? 
2. How the system would fail to fulfill these functions? 
3. What may be the cause of a functional failure? 
4. If a failure occurs, what will happen? 
5. What are the consequences after the failure occurs? 
50 
 
6. How to notice and then avoid the failure? 
7. What should do when cannot found a suitable preventive task? 
The main objectives to get of an RCM analysis process are (1) effective maintenance 
tasks identified; (2) these tasks evaluated by some CBA; and (3) a plan for carrying out 
the identified maintenance tasks at optimal intervals prepared (Rausand & Vatn, 
2008:80). 
 
4.4. RCM procedures 
 
Carrying out the RCM procedures, there is a certain sequence of activities to take care of. 
Some of the activities, in other words, steps, overlap in time sequence. The steps are used 
to define the required information to finalize the maintenance programming. These steps 
provide a baseline definition of preferred PM tasks on each system and they are explained 
in more details in the following subsections. The seven RCM steps to describe the 
systematic approach are defined in the following process flow chart (Figure 17.) (Nowlan 
& Heap, 1978:6-9; Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004:337; Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:26): 
Figure 17. RCM process procedures (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:26) 
4.4.1. Step 1: System selection and data collection 
 
Step 1.
• System selection
• Data collection
Step 2.
• System 
boundary 
definition
Step 3.
• System 
description
• Functional block 
diagram (FBD)
Step 4.
• System function
• Functional 
failures
Step 5.
• Failure mode 
effect analysis 
(FMEA)
Step 6.
• Logic tree 
analysis (LTA)
Step 7.
• Task selection
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A level where component, system or plant should be conducted in the analysis: 
- Part or piece of a part should be conducted in the lowest level, where equipment 
is possible to disassemble without damaging or causing a destruction of the item. 
(Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:26). 
- Conducting components or black boxes; a grouping or collections of piece parts 
into some package that performs at least one significant function as a stand-alone 
item. In addition, groupings such as modules, circuit boards, and subassemblies, 
should be performed in the intermediate buildup levels between parts and 
components. (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:26) 
- A system conducting as a logical grouping of components that performs a series 
of key functions that plant, or facility requires (Nowlan & Heap, 1978:7; Hoseinie 
& Kumar, 2016:26). 
- When conducting plant or facility analysis, logical grouping of systems that 
function together to provide an output (e.g. electricity) or product (e.g. mineral, 
ore) by processing and manipulating various input raw materials and feedback 
(e.g. oil, LNG, water) (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:26). 
 
Selection making if the entire plant or facility is not taking a part in the process: 
According to the research of Hoseinie and Kumar (2016), the most efficient and 
meaningful function list for RCM analysis is at the system level, when approaching PM 
planning from the point of view of function. The defining significance of functions and 
functional failures at the component level becomes difficult. Performing meaningful 
priority rankings of failure modes competing for limited PM resources is sometimes 
impossible. (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:27). 
 
4.4.2. Step 2. System boundary definition 
 
Precise system boundary definition is important in the RCM analysis process for two 
reasons: (1) there has to be precise knowledge of what has or has not been included in the 
system so an accurate list of components can be identified or, on the other hand, so that 
the identified components will not overlap with components in an adjacent system; (2) 
both system interfaces (IN and OUT) includes to boundary definition, as well as 
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interactions that establish inputs and outputs of a system. An accurate definition of IN 
and OUT interfaces is a requirement for fulfilling the following steps 3 and 4. (Hoseinie 
& Kumar, 2016:27) 
 
4.4.3. Step 3. System description and Functional Block Diagram 
 
Purpose of system description and Functional Block Diagram (FBD) is to identify and 
document the systems essential details, which are required to perform the remaining steps 
in a thorough and technically correct method. RCM process step 3 must establish the five 
following details (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:29): 
1. System description 
2. Functional block diagram 
3. IN/OUT interfaces 
4. System work breakdown structure 
5. Equipment history 
 
In this point of the analysis, a lot of vital information is collected about how the system 
is composed and how does it operate (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:29). The aim is to get the 
process through the FBD, which is a top-level representation of the major functions 
performed by the system. That is why the blocks are labeled as functional subsystems. 
The block diagram is composed only of functions, which does not include components or 
equipment titles. The FBD is used for defining the failure as the inability to deliver the 
function (Narayan, 2004:189), where systems should be represented by five or less major 
functions (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004:90). 
 
Smith & Hinchliffe (2004:139) states that the number of functional subsystems should be 
limited. In addition, the FBD together with the boundary overview provides a valuable 
description of the initial phase of the system analysis process. The best timing for this 
step is immediately after the system boundary overview. That is how reaching an early 
agreement, whether tackle the entire system or only some individual subsystems, is 
possible. (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004:139) 
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An engine and a power plant consist of many systems, sub-systems, and equipment items. 
These may be in series, parallel, or some combination of a reliability point of view. In a 
series system, failure of any component will result in a system failure. For example, in 
the following chart (Figure 18.) all three components (A, B and C) must work for the 
system to work. The figure is represented in Boolean notation by using AND gates to link 
the components. For example, in a functioning engine: A could be a piston, B - cooling 
system, and C could be oil pump. (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004:90, Hoseinie & Kumar, 
2016:30) 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Reliability Block Diagram of a series system 
 
To function properly, engines pistons, cooling system, and oil pumps need to be in good 
shape. Making simplifying assumption that each of the systems’ failures represented by 
an exponential distribution, the overall engine reliability is the outcome of the individual 
systems’ reliability. (Narayan, 2004:13-14) 
 
When the number of components in series increases, the system reliability falls. 
Therefore, complex systems might be unreliable. Some components could be very 
reliable, but the overall system weakens when there are plenty of different components. 
Not just weakening the productivity level, but also becoming dangerous in the worst-case 
scenario. So-called KISS (keep it simple, stupid) principle should not be forgotten in 
terms of the reliability block diagram (RBD). (Narayan, 2004:14) 
 
In addition to the series system, RBD may be utilized with parallel elements as well. For 
example, in the following chart (Figure 19.) components (A, B and C) are in the parallel 
relation. In the parallel case, only one of the components (A, B or C) needs to work for 
the system to be effective. This type of arrangement works with for example fire detection 
systems with voting logic, and standby equipment in a one out of two (1oo2) or two out 
of three (2oo3) or similar configuration. The figure is represented in Boolean notation by 
using OR gates to link the components. (Narayan, 2004:14) 
A B C 
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Figure 19. Reliability Block Diagram of a parallel system 
 
Contrastingly to RBD in series elements, with parallel elements, the system reliability 
increases rapidly with the level of redundancy. With the high level of redundancy is 
possible to tolerate low component reliability levels. Each of the blocks represents the 
individual system that determines how effective the whole plant will be in meeting its 
functional objectives, in terms of the configuration reliability and capacity rating. Certain 
systems are more critical than others, since the impact of the loss of function may be 
bigger than some other systems. (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:29-30) 
 
4.4.4. Step 4. System functions and functional failures 
 
RCM system functions and performance standards for functional failures consists of two 
steps: (1) functions and associated performance standards of the asset in its present 
operating context, and (2) ways that the system can fail to fulfill its functions. 
 
First step: Functions and associated performance standards of the asset in its present 
operating context. SAE international (2011) lists four key concepts about the functions 
for the system or asset: 
• Operating Context 
• Primary and secondary functions 
• Function statement 
• Performance standard 
 
A 
B 
C 
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The operating context transacts with the environment, which under the asset or system 
are supposed to operate. The operating context will affect the analysis further, so it should 
be as specific as possible. Every asset or system has its own intended function, the reason 
for its existence. 
 
The functions can be divided into two; primary and secondary functions (SAE 
International, 2011; Moubray, 1997:47). Primary functions are the main reason for the 
asset or system existence, and that is why those need to be defined as specific as possible. 
The secondary functions are the functions in addition to the primary functions. The 
secondary functions are usually not as easy to discover as the primary functions, since a 
list of secondary functions may result in a very long list. Therefore, should always 
consider the relevance of the listed functions according to the analysis. (Moubray, 
1997:47-48) 
 
Function statement is in use to describe the functions. Statement typically contains an 
object, a verb, and a performance standard (Moubray, 1997). An example of a functional 
statement would be following: maintain the piston in two hours. This example consists of 
an object the piston, a verb to maintain, and the performance standard is the time-period 
of two hours. 
 
The performance standard states how the system should operate and what is required. The 
performance standard can be defined in two ways: desired performance, and built-in 
capability. It signifies what the owner wants it to do when the built-in capability stands 
for what it is (actually) capable to do. 
 
Second step: Ways that the system can fail to fulfill its functions. After completing the 
first step, the second step takes place. SAE International (2011) defines functional failure 
as “a state in which a physical asset or system is unable to perform a specific function to 
a desired level of performance”. This definition means that the second step deals with 
failures of the functions that were stated in the first step. As the definition mentioned, 
functional failure is a state, but it does not answer how the functional failure occurred. 
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The second step is a part of the analysis that identifies all the possible states at which the 
asset or system failure. (SAE International, 2011) 
 
The system may have a total failure, which indicates that the asset or system will not work 
at all. Another kind of failure state is a partial failure. These two scenarios are easier to 
understand through an example: When cylinder output of the LNG engine is 480kW, 
engine speed is 720rpm. This cylinder has two potential functional failures: 
 
TOTAL FAILURE  PARTIAL FAILURE 
→ Cylinder stops working  → Cylinder is not working correctly 
→ Engine speed is 0 rpm  → Engine speed is under 720 rpm 
 
The first functional failure represents a total failure of the cylinder, causing by small 
particles scoring surface, cylinder seizing, overheating, or the cylinder breaking in pieces. 
The second functional failure represents a partial failure that could be caused by very 
small particles scoring surface or light overheating. 
 
4.4.5. Step 5. FMEA & FMECA 
 
Identify failure modes that can defeat the functions. Combination of letters FMEA stands 
for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. FMEA is a bottom-up (hardware) approach to risk 
assessment. It is an inductive analytical method, performed at either the functional or the 
piece-part level. Failure modes are the ways in which a process can fail. Effects in the 
analysis are the ways that these failures can lead to waste, defects or harmful outcomes 
for the customer. To clarify, the qualitative tool FMEA explores “what-if scenarios”, it is 
designed to identify, prioritize and limit these failure modes. In addition, it is closely 
related to tool FMECA. (Moubray, 1997:48-50) 
 
An important task in FMEA is identifying known and potential failure modes (Narayan, 
2004:190). With the help of data and knowledge of the process or equipment, each 
potential failure mode and effect is rated. There are three factors for rating these potential 
failure modes: (1) Severity is the consequence for the failure when it occurs; (2) 
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Occurrence is the probability or frequency of the failure occurring; and (3) Detection 
defines the probability of the failure being detected before the impact of the effects is 
realized (Moubray, 1997:91; Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:33). 
 
Letter combination FMECA signifies Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis, 
which is a bottom-up (hardware) or top-down (functional) approach to risk assessment. 
FMECA consists of two activities: first, create the FMEA; then perform the Criticality 
Analysis. FMECA is inductive or data-driven, linking elements of the failure chain as an 
effect of failure (Quality-One, 2015). Both tools, FMEA and FMECA, identifies and then 
resolves the failure modes, which potentially causes product or process failures. 
 
The effect of failure duplicates the experience of user/customer, and after is translated 
into the technical failure description or failure mode. The technical failure description 
introduces causes that result in the failure mode. (Narayan, 2004:189). Quality-One 
(2015) states that “each failure mode has a probability assigned and each cause has a 
failure rate assigned”. When data is not available, the probability of occurrence assigned 
as well. The failure data source -documents are the source for counting the probability, 
which are are all utilized in the FMECA. The technical failure description answers the 
question “why”, as well as introduces causes that result in the failure mode (Quality-One, 
2015). 
 
The intent of the FMECA methodology is to increase knowledge of risk and prevent 
failure. Performing FMECA, instead of only performing FMEA, takes a place when 
desire is to have more quantitative risk determination. The FMECA requires completing 
the FMEA process worksheet first and then completing the FMECA criticality worksheet. 
Worksheet divided in two parts as follows (Figure 20.) (Quality-One, 2015): 
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Figure 20. Two parts of FMECA worksheet (Quality-One, 2015) 
 
After identifying functions for the asset or systems with its functional failures, the next 
step is to identify why the failures occur. FMECA is a tool of RCM analysis to identify 
those failures. FMECA analyzes risk, measured by criticality, which is a combination of 
severity and probability. By analyzing the risk, it is possible to act and thus provide an 
opportunity to reduce the possibility of failure. One of the most important objectives of 
FMECA is to identify the failure modes for the components in the system, the causes, and 
their effects. (Quality-One, 2015) 
 
Procedures of the FMECA process is usually carried out in seven steps: 
1. Plan and prepare 
2. Carry out system breakdown and functional analysis 
3. Identify failure modes and causes 
4. Determine the consequences of the failure modes 
5. Assess the risk 
6. Suggest improvements 
7. Report the analysis 
First part: 
FMEA Portion
• Define the system
• Define ground rules and assumptions to help drive the 
design
• Construct system boundary diagrams and parameter 
diagrams
• Identify failure modes
• Analyze failure effects
• Determine causes of the failure modes
• Feed results back into design process
Second part:
FMECA Portion
• Transfer Information from the FMEA to the FMECA
• Classify the failure effects by severity (change to FMECA 
severity)
• Perform criticality calculations
• Rank failure mode criticality and determine highest risk 
items
• Take mitigation actions and document the remaining risk 
with rationale
• Follow-up on corrective action 
implementation/effectiveness
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Even though the procedures are performed on a component level, the effect of the failure 
is assessed on the asset. FMECA includes a unit of quantitative input taken from a source 
of known failure rates. 
 
Executing FMECA process in practice, proceed as follows: (1) identify failure modes, 
including their causes; (2) asses the effects each of the failure modes has on the asset; (3) 
take care of criticality part, which includes safety, asset, availability, and environment; 
(4) include the MTBF (Mean Time Before Failure) for the components to the analysis, as 
well as MTTF (Mean Time to Failure). MTBF is used for repairable items, MTTF for 
non-repairable items. Consequently, MTBF is considered for both repairable and non-
repairable components. (Quality-One, 2015) 
 
The means for quantifying how important a system function is relative to the identified 
mission is provided by the criticality assesment. Following table (Table 1.) provides a 
method for ranking system criticality, with 10 categories of Criticality/Severity by NASA 
(2008). These categories can be explained or contracted to produce a site-specific listing. 
This system is adapted from the automotive industry (Pecht, 2009) and it is not the only 
method available. 
  
60 
 
Table 1. Criticality/Severity categories for failures (NASA, 2008) 
Ranking Effect Comment 
1 None 
No reason to expect failure to have any effect on safety, 
health, environment or mission. 
2 Very Low 
Minor disruption to facility function. Repair to failure can be 
accomplished during trouble call. 
3 Low 
Minor disruption to facility function. Repair to failure may be 
longer than trouble call but does not delay mission. 
4 
Low to 
Moderate 
Moderate disruption to facility function. Some portion of 
mission may need to be reworked or process delayed. 
5 Moderate 
Moderate disruption to facility function. 100% of mission 
may need to be reworked or process delayed. 
6 
Moderate to 
High 
Moderate disruption to facility function. Some portion of 
Mission is lost. Moderate delay in restoring function. 
7 High 
High disruption to facility function. Some portion of Mission 
is lost. Significant delay in restoring function. 
8 Very High 
High disruption to facility function. All of Mission is lost. 
Significant delay in restoring function. 
9 Hazard 
Potential Safety, Health, or Environmental issue. Failure will 
occur with warning. 
10 
Very 
Hazardous 
Potential Safety, Health, or Environmental issue. Failure will 
occur without warning. 
 
When finally turning the question of defining the required PM tasks, decisions are linked 
to these failure modes (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:34). This means that none of the failure 
modes leads to RCM without PM task (August, 2004:19). Failure modes are generally 
described in four or fewer words, and for clarifying things, the following list (Table 2.) 
of typical descriptors for failure modes demonstrates the used terms by Smith & 
Hinchcliffe (2004): 
 
RCM-Systems Analysis Process (Figure 21.) is a typical form for equipment-functional 
failure matrix (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004). It is generally considered as “connecting 
tissue” between function and hardware. Vertical and horizontal elements are the 
component list based on Step 3 (chapter 4.4.3.), and the functional failure list based 
respectively on Step 4 (chapter 4.4.4.). 
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Table 2. List of typical descriptors for failure modes (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:34; Smith 
& Hinchcliffe, 2004) 
abrasion  clogged disintegrated lack of... overstress shorted 
arcing collapsed ductile leak overpressure split 
backward cut embrittlement loose overspeed sticking 
out of balance contaminated eroded lost pitted torn 
bent corroded exploded melted plugged twisted 
binding cracked 
false 
indication 
missing punctured unbounded 
blown damaged fatigue nicked ruptured unstable 
broken defective fluctuates notched scored wrapped 
buckled delaminated frayed open scratched worn 
burned deteriorated intermittent overheat separated  
chafed disconnected incorrect over-temp shattered  
chipped dirty jammed overload sheared  
 
 
Figure 21. Equipment-functional failure matrix example (Smith & Hinchcliffe, 2004) 
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4.4.6. Step 6. Logic Tree Analysis 
 
Logic (decision) Tree Analysis (LTA) prioritizes function need via failure modes. The 
decision tree structure is created to identify each failure mode in one of three distinct 
areas, so-called bins, in the basic LTA (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:34-35): 
• Safety-related 
• Outage-related 
• Economics-related 
Each failure mode is entered to the top box of the tree and then answers the questions. 
For example, in the normal course of the daily duties, does the operator know that 
something abnormal or harmful has occurred? The operator does not necessarily have to 
know exactly what is wrong, but the question is for establishing those so-called hidden 
failure modes. The traditional hidden failures occur in standby systems or components 
and are difficult to discover before it is too late. (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:35) 
 
 
Figure 22. LTA structure (Rausand, 1998) 
Failure mode
Under normal 
conditions, the operator 
know that somehing 
has occurred?
Yes
Failure mode cause a 
safety problem?
Yes
Safety 
problem
No
Failure mode result in 
a full or partial 
outage?
Yes
Outage 
problem
No
Minor 
insignificant 
economic 
problem
No
Hidden 
failure
(1) Evident 
(2) Safety 
(3) Outage 
A 
B C 
D 
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When all failure modes are identified, both evident and hidden, the second concern is 
whether these failure modes lead to a safety problem or not. Safety basically refers to 
person death or injury, either on-site or off-site. In basic RCM process definition of safety 
is limited to injury or death, even though equipment damage is sometimes included to 
safety part. (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:35) 
 
If there is no safety issue, the remaining concern of interest is the economics of a facility. 
The economic issue is measured by focusing on facility failure or loss of productivity. 
Measuring whether the failure mode result is a full failure or partial failure, where the 
partial failure mode result, in a loss of output, would be for example >5%. The edge value 
of 5% depends on several variables, so the analyst should adjust this value to suit the 
situation. Meaning that answer “Yes” in question A moves the analysis to bin B, which 
represents outage and significant loss of income. If the answer to A is “No”, economic 
loss is small and places analysis to bin C. Bin C signifies that failure mode is tolerable 
until the next opportunity to restore the equipment to its full specified performance. 
Examples for C-type bin failure modes would be small leaks and degraded heat transfer. 
(Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:35-36) 
 
After finishing the LTA process, every failure mode is classified as A, B, C, D/A, D/B or 
D/C. The most common way to address PM priorities as follows (Hoseinie & Kumar, 
2016:36): 
1. A or D/A 
2. B or D/B 
3. C or D/C 
The evidence is rather strong; therefore, the C-bin should be relegated to the run-to-failure 
(RTF) list. It is also recommended that all failure modes from C-bin would be designated 
as RTF and changed only if they do not pass the check in the final Step 7. In this type of 
case, only classifications A or B failure modes are passed on. (Hoseinie & Kumar, 
2016:36) 
 
Logic Tree is an effective way to screen maintenance tasks, which provides a consistent 
approach to the maintenance of all equipment. The following figure is an example of 
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RCM Logic Tree that NASA (2008) is implementing (Figure 23.) as a part of their RCM 
guide for facilities and collateral equipment. 
 
 
Figure 23. RCM tree logic by NASA (2008) 
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4.4.7. Step 7. Maintenance task selection 
 
Select only applicable and effective PM tasks. PM task selection provides the 
maintenance solutions based on the, in the previous chapters mentioned, six steps. The 
RCM process requires each task to complete the effective and applicable test, which both 
has following requirements (Smith & Hinchliffe, 2004:242): 
• Effective: the task is the most cost-effective option among the competing 
candidates 
• Applicable: the task will prevent or mitigate the failure, detect an onset of failure, 
or discover a hidden failure 
 
RTF is the only option if there is no applicable task, or in the situation where the cost of 
an applicable PM task exceeds the cumulative costs associated with failure. Exceptions 
are situations where design modification in A-bin or safety-related failure mode is 
mandatory. (Hoseinie & Kumar, 2016:36; Smith & Hinchliffe, 2004:155) 
 
Maintenance staff should be involved in task selection to gain the benefit of their 
experience and to ensure their buy-in to the RCM process. This is especially relevant if 
predictive maintenance and performance monitoring options are introduced. Following 
flowchart (Figure 24.) of maintenance task selection in the RCM process is especially 
useful to develop PM tasks for each selected and targeted failure mode. (Hoseinie & 
Kumar, 2016:36) 
 
Following task selection road map (Figure 24.) is defined by Smith & Hinchcliffe 
(2004:112), where the first question is about the age-reliability relationship. When the 
road map continues with “yes” or “partial” answers, following questions deal with time-
dependent (T.D.), condition-dependent (C.D.), and failure-finding (F.F.) tasks. The result 
of the task selection road map is categorized into three different possibilities: (1) specify 
T.D./C.D./F.F. tasks; (2) accept failure risks; and (3) modification of the design. 
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Figure 24. Task selection road map (Smith & Hinchliffe, 2004:112) 
 
Nowlan & Heap (1978:46) discusses patterns of the age-reliability relationships, whether 
there are age-related effects in the failure rate or not. Statistics are collected from the 
United Airlines during the years (note: source is from the 1978 so its validity is not 
optimum). Study (Figure 25.) visualizes the age reliability relationship (Nowlan & Heap, 
1978:46). 
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In the following chart (Figure 25.) of the age-reliability patterns, the vertical axis 
represents the conditional probability of failure and the horizontal axis represents 
operating age since manufacture, overhaul, or repair. The percentages indicate the 
percentage of items studied that well into each of the basic patterns. (Nowlan & Heap, 
1978:46) 
 
 
Figure 25. Age-reliability patterns as aircraft failure characteristics (Nowlan & Heap, 
1978:46; Siddiqui, 2009:399) 
 
Explaining the curves of the previous chart (Figure 25.) (Nowlan & Heap, 1978:46): 
A. “The bathtub curve”: infant mortality, followed first by a constant or gradually 
increasing failure probability and then pronounced as a wearout region. Wearout 
defined as a situation in which a product can no longer be used because it has 
_______________ 
 
 
 
11% might benefit 
from a limit on 
operating age 
 
 
 
 
_______________ 
 
 
 
89% cannot 
benefit from a 
limit on operating 
age 
 
 
 
_______________ 
 
A 
 
B 
 
D 
 
C 
 
F 
 
E 
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become damaged after having been used for a certain time (Cambridge dictionary, 
cited 11.12.2018). An age limit may be desirable, provided many units survive to 
the age which wearout begins. 
B. Constant or gradually increasing failure probability: followed by a pronounced 
wearout region. Also, in curve B an age limit may be desirable (B curve is 
characteristic of aircraft reciprocating engines). 
C. Gradually increasing failure probability: but with no identifiable wearout age. It 
is usually not desirable to impose an age limit in such cases (this curve is 
characteristic of aircraft turbine engines). 
D. Low failure probability: when the item is new or just out of the shop, followed by 
a quick increase to a constant level.  
E. Random: a constant probability of failure at all ages (exponential survival 
distribution). 
F. Infant mortality: followed by a constant or very slowly increasing failure 
probability (particularly applicable to electronic equipment). 
 
4.5. Fault Tree Analysis – Developing the RCM process 
 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a tool for managing the RAMS. In this case, FTA is used 
for developing the RCM procedures by including the analysis. Instead of using traditional 
FMECA analysis as a risk assessment tool in the RCM process, FTA is one option for 
optimizing the RCM in practice. Modeling and making a risk analysis of complex systems 
with FTA is easier and more practical than with FMECA. For example, results of FMECA 
include only failure rate, not any costs of the failure nor how the failure modes are in 
relation with each other. FTA aims to improve the system most efficiently, by processing 
data into information and progressively to knowledge about these vital factors to make 
rational decisions. (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:471) 
 
Explicit understanding of risk related system quality attributes, such as reliability, 
availability, maintainability, and safety, are required to verify quality and to assess 
(identify, analyze & evaluate) the risks of the system. The alternatives can be compared 
in the design phase by creating and analyzing a model that describes the features of the 
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system under design. The modeling enables predicting the overall effect of purposed 
modifications when taking already existing systems into account. The performance of the 
current system can be improved without any major modifications and investments by the 
maintenance spare part policy optimization. (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:471-472) 
 
The overall risk identification process (i.e. risk assessment) includes three different 
stages: risk identification, analysis, and evaluation (ISO Guide 73, 2009). ISO Guide 73 
(2009) defines risk as an effect of uncertainty of objectives. Finding, recognizing and 
describing risks is the first step, which basically means collecting the available 
information to a comprehensive model. Risk analysis aims to comprehend the nature and 
to determine the risk level, which is done with stochastic (i.e. random) discrete event 
simulation of the model (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:472). Risk evaluation compares the 
results with risk criteria to determine whether the risk and its magnitude are acceptable 
or tolerable (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:472-473). Risk assessment process as a part of 
risk management and systems engineering is illustrated in the following chart of relations 
(Figure 26.). 
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Figure 26. Risk management process (Penttinen & Lehtinen, 2016:473) 
 
In addition, Smith & Hinchcliffe (2004:29) ponders if there are new procedures or 
modifications to existing procedures required. Rausand & Vatn (2008:80) adds five steps 
to the mentioned seven steps of RCM process (Figure 27.), where also occurs some 
changes in the time sequence. In addition, the structuring is slightly different than in the 
various standards, guidelines, and textbooks (Rausand & Vatn, 2008:80). 
Actions before
Actions after
Risk identification
Collect available 
information to 
model
Risk analysis
Stochastic discrete 
event simulation
Risk evaluation
Report explicit 
results, compare 
scenarios, etc.
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Figure 27. Modified RCM process procedures (Rausand & Vatn, 2008:80; Mainsaver 
2008:2-4)  
1. Study 
preparation
2. System 
selection and 
definition
3. Functional 
failure analysis 
(FFA)
4.Critical item 
selection
5. Data 
collection and 
analysis
6. FMECA
7. Selection of 
maintenance 
actions
8. 
Determination 
of maintenance 
intervals
9. Preventive 
maintenance 
comparison 
analysis
10. Treatment 
of non-critical 
items
11. 
Implementation
12. In-service 
data collection 
and updating
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5. RESEARCH CASE: WÄRTSILÄ SERVICES 
 
5.1. Wärtsilä Services in numbers 
 
Wärtsilä is a global leader in smart technologies and complete life cycle solutions for the 
marine and energy markets. Wärtsilä maximizes the environmental and economic 
performance of the vessels and power plants of its customers, by emphasizing sustainable 
innovation, total efficiency, and data analytics. The company has operations in over 200 
locations in more than 80 countries around the world, with approximately 18,000 
employees on the company’s payroll (Wärtsilä Factsheet, 2018). Wärtsilä was listed on 
NASDAQ Helsinki (stock exchange) on the first of September 1915, meaning the 
company has been listed for more than 100 years (Wärtsilä celebrating-100-years-as-
stock-listed-company, 2018). The following caption is Wärtsilä stock price historic 
development on January 15, 2019. 
 
 
Figure 28. Wärtsilä Oyj Abp stock (Google finance, cited 15.1.2019) 
 
In 2017 Wärtsilä’s net sales reached 4,923 billion euros, increasing 3% from 2016. Target 
is to grow constantly faster than the global gross domestic product (GDP) and to reach 
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this target Wärtsilä focuses on strengthening position in strategic growth markets. In 
addition to improving its financial performance, the company also creates added value 
for its stakeholders and society. (Wärtsilä targets and achievements, 2018) 
 
Wärtsiläs net sales by business groups in 2017 including three main business areas: 
Services, Energy solutions, and Marine solutions. Percentages of the business net sales 
divided as follows (Figure 29.): 
 
Figure 29. Wärtsilä net sales by business in 2017 (Wärtsilä Factsheet, 2018) 
 
Wärtsilä Services is a crucial part of its business entirety: Service is 45%, of total EUR 
4,9 billion net sales, signifies more than EUR 2,2 billion shares of the whole Wärtsilä’s 
net sales. Services business covers both the marine solutions and the energy solutions 
businesses in their service portfolio. As a long-term partner for its customers, the main 
market driver is a life cycle efficiency for which the availability, reliability and economic 
viability take the biggest roles. The marine service business is strongly driven by existing, 
as well as new, environmental regulations. Wärtsilä service agreements ensure reliable 
performance from receiving of fuel to supplying energy. In addition, lower operating 
costs, the need for enhanced safety, and the need to outsource the operations and 
management of power plants, complete the service portfolio. (Wärtsilä’s markets, 2018) 
74 
 
5.2. Services as a source of stable cash flow 
 
Long-term contracts and service agreements are the best resources to earn a stable cash 
flow to the company (Dechow, 1992). Vessel engines and power plants are produced by 
make-to-order (MTO) method, therefore Marine and Energy solutions net sales are based 
on project-related income. As a result, long-term contracts are stabilizing Wärtsilä’s 
annual source of revenue, even if the Marine and Energy solutions sales would undershoot 
their targets. 
 
Wärtsilä Services Catalogue offers seven different solution types to choose from 
(Wärtsilä Services Catalogue for Marines, 2018): 
1. Upgrading solutions to improve performance, efficiency, uptime, safety, and 
operational costs. 
2. Parts solutions to ensure always having high-quality spare parts ready at anytime 
and anywhere as customer needs them. 
3. Life cycle solutions ensuring equipment performance with solutions covering 
servicing, maintenance, and operation. 
4. Analytics & monitoring solutions prevent the unexpected with continuous 
monitoring and analysis. 
5. Maintenance & repair services guarantee that equipment is performing at its best 
and keep unplanned downtime to a minimum. 
6. Expertise services improve the performance or solve problems with expert 
analysis and recommendations based on equipment data and information gathered 
during inspection visits. 
7. Training services on a wide range of topics by Wärtsilä experts, including 
management, operation, maintenance, and safety. 
 
To execute the servitization model in solution business, Wärtsilä must develop and 
perform their model continuously. In this thesis, the focus is to develop a maintenance 
analysis process for life cycle solutions for preventing the unexpected failures as a part 
of the RCM process, explained in the fourth chapter. Monitoring, collecting and 
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processing data is a key factor to success. Condition monitoring and collecting data is 
performed by IoT solutions and data processing by bid data analysis. 
 
5.3. Research target 
 
Current maintenance planning for the service agreement includes a standard plan, which 
is not always the most appropriate way to take customers’ asset and business into account. 
In addition, production losses and installation configurations do not cause any changes in 
the maintenance plan, and the spare parts policy follows the standard plan. Maintenance 
tasks are mainly executed by periodic overhauls, counted from the operating time e.g. 
every 10000 running hours. In periodic overhaul concept, the timing for the maintenance 
tasks depends on engine type and its total meter reading. Some maintenance intervals 
have been specified depending on the installation’s average load or amount of fuel spent. 
 
The standard maintenance plan is not optimal for every installation, since some customers 
are taking availability into account already at the installation planning phase, and some 
are running installation only with one main engine. Therefore, customers are demanding 
more advanced and tailored services, and thus creating individualized and optimized 
maintenance plans are the aim for maintenance planning. 
 
Research target is to develop a systematic method to analyze customers’ asset and 
business to optimize maintenance plan for long term service agreement, i.e. maintenance 
analysis process for service plan optimization. In addition, engaging discussions about 
Wärtsilä reaching Approval of Service Supplier notation for RCM concept. An outcome 
of the research will be a developed and documented streamlined RCM process for 
Wärtsilä Services to create tailored maintenance plans of customers’ assets considering 
installation configuration and customer’s business needs. Constraints are limited to power 
generation systems, and the focus is on maintenance management. 
 
In Wärtsilä Services, RCM process does not have a notable role in the maintenance 
management. Therefore, there is not enough measurable data to formulate facts and 
uncover patterns as required in quantitative research. Also, it is not useful to have group 
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discussions or multiple individual interviews to uncover trends and opinions for digging 
deeper into the problem as qualitative research requires (Newman & Ridenour, 1998). 
However, interactive discussions with the Specialist from Wärtsilä Marine Business 
Asset Management Services, and Reliability Specialist from Ramentor Oy, was 
performed to collect some qualitative data. Results of discussions included transformative 
knowledge of developing RCM method for the case study. In addition, to have adequate 
research data, a methodology of design science (DS) research is taking a place in this 
thesis. 
 
5.4. Research methodology & Dataset 
 
“Whereas natural sciences and social sciences try to understand 
reality, design science attempts to create things that serve human 
purposes” (Peffers, et al., 2007). 
 
Design science (DS) research methodology is an information technology-based outcome 
of research. DS offers guidelines for evaluation and iteration within research projects and 
focuses on the development and performance of designed items, with the intention of 
improving its functional performance. DS creates and evaluates information systems as 
an intention to solve identified organizational problems. (Peffers, et al., 2007) 
 
DS involves a comprehensive and rigorous process to design items to solve discovered 
problems, to make research contributions, to evaluate the designs, and to communicate 
the results to appropriate audiences. These items may consist of models, constructs, 
methods, and installations, as well as social innovations or new properties of technical, 
social, or informational resources (Hevner, March & Park, 2004). Shortly, the definition 
of DS would be any designed object with an embedded solution to an understood research 
problem (Peffers, et al., 2007). 
 
To develop the maintenance analysis process for service plan optimization, design science 
method together with a qualitative method, interviewing subject specialists, are 
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composing comprehensive research results. Interviewed persons are: A specialist from 
Wärtsilä Marine Business Asset Management Services, and Reliability Specialist from 
Ramentor Oy. Interviews do not follow predefined open-ended question list, instead, 
having a comprehensive discussion about considered topics. 
 
The discussed topics: 
1. A content of the traditional RCM process, standards, and guidelines 
2. Possibility to modify the RCM process procedures 
3. Possibility to replace FMEA and FMECA with FTA 
4. A structure of the FTA in the modified RCM process 
5. FTA software, an introduction of ELMAS 
6. RCM-based LTA to Wärtsilä Services environment 
 
The reliability specialist Lehtinen have years of experience about the RCM process. 
Lehtinen emphasizes that the fault tree analysis is a more accurate method for indicating 
time intervals between failures, failure recovery time, and maintenance costs, than the 
FMECA. A discussion, if a bottom-up or top-down method should be practiced in the 
Wärtsilä -case, ended in consensus within the bottom-up method. 
 
During the research, some of the case company’s failure data archives were analyzed to 
make conclusions of the maintenance plan possibilities and requirements. Failure data 
and engine information are also used to create an ELMAS -model for testing the FTA 
software’s operability. 
 
The research results are presented further in the modified and streamlined RCM process 
(chapter 5.6.) since the research discussions handled mainly of developing the RCM 
process for Wärtsilä Services environment. An analyzing tool for the FTA is presented 
with screenshots in the 5th step (chapter 5.6.5). FTA software that is used in this thesis, 
ELMAS, is created by Ramentor Oy. 
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5.5. Launching the RCM process for the case company 
 
Launching the RCM process is started by identifying requirements from related 
specialists (i.e. subject matter experts). Requirements for launching are: 
1. Plan 
2. Measure 
3. Train 
4. Perform 
5. Implement 
6. Complete 
 
Taking advantage of engine experts and their extensive practical experience is the best 
way to identify these requirements. Next step is evaluating the available experience and 
the need for external expertise, along with possibility and need for training requirements. 
In this phase also deciding if internal or external RCM facilitator is going to be used. In 
the pilot stage, an external specialist can be used to gather expertise in facilitating. When 
the streamlined RCM process is up and running, the aim is to use internal facilitators for 
constant actions. 
 
The traditional RCM method is not always the most optimal concept to launch as a 
maintenance management tool. By blindly following the steps of traditional RCM (incl. 
FMECA and standards etc.) step-by-step and top-down, the result might be purely too 
simple, and there is a bigger risk that the process is misunderstood or used wrong. The 
traditional process cannot manage to re-plan, modify or develop the process if the logic 
tree analysis causes the process to end. Challenge for the traditional RCM is its launching 
for the existing processes. Generally, RCM is launched in an early stage of a process life 
cycle. 
 
RCM process will be customized to suit the business environment of the case company 
but will not be strictly following on precise standards. Nevertheless, applicable standards 
IEC 60300-3-11 and SAE JA1011 are considered in the process execution to ensure its 
progress. Theory part explained comprehensively what these standards contain, but the 
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execution phase is modified for the case company’s requirements. Also, DNV GL 
guidelines are followed as a base of the research. Hence, the RCM process will not blindly 
follow RCM decision logic as theory part suggests. In RCM theory the process stops at 
the first applicable service task, instead of that, all the potential service task types will be 
gone through, starting from the most critical failure modes.  
 
Traditional RCM process is based on going through all the failure modes, which is not 
always the most suitable way. The following chapters explain how the RCM process 
should be modified, and why not all the failure modes are gone through, depending on 
their criticality. As the Pareto –principle proposes: 20% of failure modes cause 80% of 
costs of production losses (Fenton & Ohlsson, 2000:800), which is a good point in 
modifying traditional RCM process. In the Wärtsilä case, the percentages in production 
losses costs could be even 15/85 or even with a higher difference. In this case study, the 
focus is in the component level, not in every different failure mode of each component. 
 
The process is going to utilize input from the standard maintenance manual as a base of 
process planning. The engine experts define how current condition monitoring could be 
improved to better detect failure symptoms and what symptoms each failure might show. 
This is done for each relevant failure mode one by one. Experts also assist in recognizing 
failure or failure symptoms to quickly react on them and thereby increase installations 
availability. Similarly, expert knowledge and experience are used to recognize failure 
intervals in different operating conditions, according to their own experiences. Also 
defining how much quicker recovery time the component has after the failure when a 
proper condition monitoring system is installed. 
 
5.6. Modified and streamlined RCM process 
 
Usually the traditional RCM method is executed to company’s manufacturing process, 
but in this case, Wärtsilä’s aim is to offer services that are modified to each customers’ 
needs. Modified and streamlined RCM process for the case company includes the 
following procedures, which consist of seven steps as a part of its structure: 
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5.6.1. Step 1. Planning the execution of the streamlined RCM process 
 
The first step follows the traditional RCM process: system selection and data collection. 
Decide the scale what is measured, which in this case is engines systems and their 
subsystems. Reviewing what are the current and planned maintenance tasks. Modified 
RCM execution utilizes the bottom-up method, which means going through all the 
components in the system that the experts consider to be necessary, in bottom-up order. 
Starting from the most critical ones and figuring out how they and their failure modes 
affect in a higher level of the process. 
 
5.6.2. Step 2. System boundary definition 
 
Defining the system boundaries for RCM analysis is needed, since an installation may 
include many on-board and out-board instruments. Facilitating system analysis and 
ensuring better maintenance management is achieved by defining system boundaries for 
equipment and on-board components. The off-board and communication components, 
such as the navigation network, are not included to system boundary definition. 
 
Not all the installations are the same, thus defining the system boundaries need to be done 
individually for each installation. For example, system X may have control statistics in 
an engine control room physically separated from it (off-board), but the analyst believe it 
is a good idea to include those control room instruments in an analysis of the system X. 
If the control room is later analyzed as a separate system, the previously established 
boundary for system X will tell the analyst not to include those instruments in the control 
room boundary definition (on-board). 
 
Therefore, dividing installation into clear subsystems and the boundaries of target 
systems, defined with clear IN and OUT interfaces, will help to find the failure modes 
and effects of each unit in a system and to follow 80/20 rules. Some elements (signals, 
heat, fluids, gases, etc.) come IN across the boundary; others move OUT to support other 
systems. OUT interfaces represent what the system produces.  
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5.6.3. Step 3. System description and functional block diagram 
 
Basically, Step 3 aims to identify and document the essential details of the system that 
are required to perform the remaining steps in a systematic and technically correct way. 
In the third step of RCM process, the following details should be established: (1) system 
description; (2) FBDs; (3) IN/OUT interfaces; (4) system work breakdown structure; and 
(5) the equipment history. In Wärtsilä case, this is the step where adding all the engines, 
their systems, and subsystems to the “master program”, and then defining which systems 
affects with each other and how. 
 
At this point of the analysis process, there has already been collected a big amount of 
information about what constitutes the system, and how does it operate. Continuing the 
process through the FBD, which is a top-level representation of the major functions 
performed by the system. Hence, the blocks are considered as functional subsystems. The 
FBD is composed only of functions, not component or equipment titles appear in it. 
Boundary overview and the FBD together provides a valuable description of the initial 
phase of the systems analysis process.  
 
The intention of the Step 3 is to reach understanding how the components effects in the 
systems. Functional block diagrams are used to help to describe if the systems or 
subsystems are in a relationship with each other. In addition, some of the subsystems that 
have no effect on the process can be deleted from the process. All the necessary 
components will be gone through, defining what are their effects in the upper level, in 
bottom-up order. 
 
Following FBD (Figure 30.) demonstrates that not all the system functions, e.g. auxiliary 
system, affect in every engine of the installation. If the auxiliary system does not get 
enough fuel pumped, only engines 1 and 2 goes to failure mode, since the auxiliary system 
does not affect in engines 3 and 4. The figure is the highest level of the FBD and will 
include a lot of components underneath. 
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Figure 30. Functional block diagram demonstrating the system functions relations 
 
5.6.4. Step 4. System functions and functional failures 
 
This step defines how the component’s failure affect the system. The focus is on the 
functional failure of an engine and how does it impact on the engine availability, rather 
than on performance of failures. Every system has its own intended function, the primary 
function, which is the reason for its existence. When the systems functional failure occurs, 
function statement should be done. The statement describes what is the object, what needs 
to be done, and what is a functional standard in its presenting context. The number of 
secondary functions can be a very long list. Considering the relevance of the listed 
functions according to analysis is important.  
 
There are several different types that the system can fail to fulfill its functions. The system 
can fail totally: caused by small particles scoring surface, cylinder seizing, overheating, 
or the cylinder breaking in pieces; or it can fail partially: very small particles scoring 
surface or light overheating. Nevertheless, it is not effective to dig too deep into 
components functions while going further through the failure modes. It is accurate enough 
to recognize if the failure mode is a general failure or for example a leakage. 
 
Taking care of the most common failures. Some failure modes are “normal failures” and 
some are more special. For example, in the process, there could be a component with five 
different failure modes, and with the further analysis, the outcome in all modes can be the 
Installation
Engine 1 Engine 2 Engine 3 Engine 4
Auxiliary system
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same: replace the component with a new one. During the streamlined RCM process, these 
type of failure modes should be recognized, and no unnecessary effort should be made. 
 
5.6.5. Step 5. FMEA & FMECA replaced by FTA 
 
The fifth step makes a big difference. Existing failure mode, effects, and criticality 
analysis (FMECA) in traditional RCM process is used as supporting data when updating 
service actions for the most critical components. Fault tree analysis (FTA) will be 
replacing FMECA, to define relevant failure modes and their consequences for better 
support of quantitative criticality calculations. With the FTA method, time intervals 
between failures, failure recovery time, production losses, and maintenance costs are 
indicated. FTA answers how the failures impact in the process. 
 
The previous (1-4) steps of the modified RCM process are reliable and needed source for 
creating FTA model for Wärtsilä’s needs. With the help of the FTA, all the parts and 
items that need to be maintained are represented. In this step, FTA goes through all the 
hidden failures as well. 
 
In a situation, such as nuclear power plant maintenance, there are many different items 
and small details, where the bottom-up version of the maintenance process is impossible 
to execute. However, in Wärtsilä Services scenario, bottom-up is completely fine to use. 
In the top-down method there would be a lot of work that would have a small effect on 
improving system operations. Some of the consequences of failure modes are the same, 
no matter how deep is delved, therefore some failure modes can be handled quickly. The 
analysis is defined by the best available experts from the Wärtsilä. 
 
Modifying the existing maintenance plan and delivering the contract for the customer is 
a five-step process. Following five steps (Figure 31.) defines how the expert analysis is 
serving the customer at the basic level: 
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Figure 31. Steps to define how the expert analysis proceeds 
 
Explaining the steps of the previous chart (Figure 31.): 
1. Engine specific RAM models such as: failure modes, failure consequences for the 
engine, effective recovery time, and detectability, are being handled in the first 
step of the FTA process. 
2. After the engine specific RAM models are defined, the installation and customer’s 
business -step is taking place. In customer’s point of view, this step includes some 
of the most crucial issues to be specified. These topics are customer needs, 
installation configuration, cost of downtime, cost of repairs, failure rates in 
customer operating environment, and installation-specific delays in recovery 
time. 
3. Simulation for testing the effects of different service plans requires the following 
things being checked: spare parts availability, remote services, inspections, and 
maintenance schedules. 
4. The service plan for optimized life cycle costs and availability requires a 
maintenance plan that is based on optimizing. The previous (3rd) step simulates 
testing the effects of different service plans, and this (4th) step is suggesting if the 
plan can actually be modified. Modifying could be prohibited if it increases the 
safety risk. Logic tree analysis, which is taken care in the RCM Process Step 6 
(chapter 5.6.6.), prescribes the final decision of possibility of changes in the 
service plan. 
5. Contract delivery from the Expertise Centers means that the installation is going 
to be maintained as the service contract defines. Contract delivery could consist 
1. Engine 
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models
2. 
Installation 
& 
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3. 
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of maintenance planning, field service, spare part delivery, condition monitoring, 
engine operating, etc. Content depends on the scope of the service contract. In 
addition, continuous improvement and collecting statistical data are applicable 
services to improve maintenance plan. 
 
The results of the fault tree analysis are identified risks, reliable conclusion of LCC, 
availability, and reliability. Instead of FMEA or FMECA, which both results only relative 
values (usually in a scale of 1 to 1000), FTA results in actual simulated LCC costs, 
availability, and reliability. Relative values will not provide any clear information about 
actual costs, availability or reliability, which FTA are able to find out. In maintenance 
management point of view, identified risks are in many cases depending on how much 
they cost. 
 
Three critical factors taking part in the FTA method are (the same than in FMECA): 
severity, occurrence, and detection. Severity is a factor that explains how the failure 
modes effects on the system. Occurrence tells how often failure modes are occurring, and 
the detection answers to concern how to notice the failure mode in the system. This is a 
definition of detection as it is in theory part, but in the Wärtsilä case detection is more 
practical when defined as detecting component failures with operating engine systems 
before they lead into functional consequences. Also considering how effectively this 
detection is performed.  
 
The focus in criticality phase is to result in reliable LCC and availability in numbers, as 
well as define how the failure modes effects on the system and with what costs. Safety 
and environmental factors are handled in the following step, not in the criticality phase. 
Next will be explained how to make the best out of the FTA process. Avoiding human 
errors in the FTA process is best achieved through the help of technology. 
 
Ramentor is a Finnish company that created software Event Logic Modeling and Analysis 
Software (ELMAS), which is an analyzing tool for FTA. ELMAS is one option but 
analyzing tool could be any other FTA software as well. This chapter describes how the 
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FTA software is functioning in practice, clarified by using screenshots of an example 
installation 583 (Figure 32.) with four engines (584, 1062, 1540, 2018). 
 
 
Figure 32. Screenshot of ELMAS in the highest FTA level 
 
The engines have plenty of different causes that might lead to some failure mode. In this 
installation 583, three functioning engines are needed to keep the installation run 
effectively. Hence, if two out of four (2oo4) engines are in the failure mode, the 
installation is not functioning. Therefore, the port in the highest level is “voting” port, 
which means that failure mode will be resulting after 2oo4 engines fail. All the other ports 
are “or” types, and they describe how the component failures are affecting in the higher 
level in FTA. 
 
As it is shown in the following screenshot (Figure 33.), engine (2018) has internal systems 
(2019) and external systems (2691). In this example, internal systems box is expanded, 
so the internal systems could be approached. Internal systems consist of different parts, 
such as engine components (2020), charge air and exhaust gas system (2338), cooling 
water system (2406), fuel oil system (2528), etc. Internal system n (2670) is an example 
system that is going to be clarifying FTA’s functioning in the level of system components 
(Figure 33.). 
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Figure 33. Screenshot of ELMAS in internal/external systems level 
 
Expanding Internal system n (2670) leads to the component level of FTA (Figure 34.). 
This system n (2670) includes four different components: Component 1 (2671); 
Component 2 (2675); Component 3 (2679); and Component 4 (2683). Some of the 
systems may include hundreds of different components, so there are multiple variations 
to calculate for defining LCC and availability. 
 
 
Figure 34. Screenshot of ELMAS in component level 
 
Expanding one of the component boxes (Component 4 - 2683) leads to four different 
scenarios of how to carry out different failure modes. Each of the four different versions 
of failure modes (2684, 2687, 2688 & 2690) has its detailed and individual calculations 
of preventing the failure and causes of the failure (Figure 35.). 
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Figure 35. Screenshot of ELMAS in the lowest level of FTA - defining possibilities of 
different scenarios 
 
The lowest level of FTA consists of four different scenarios of a component failure. 
Defining possibilities of different scenarios clarifies the most suitable ways to continue 
in the scenarios of planned (2684), prepared (2687), sudden (2688), and sudden with extra 
damages (2690) types of maintenance needs. Repairing time is determined by taking 
repairing delays into account, which are caused by tools and spare parts availability and 
their delivery time, maintenance staff’s availability, and repairing costs (Figure 35.). 
Component 4 (2683) repairing time and cost in different scenarios: 
- Box 2684 (planned): No repairing time. An assumption is that the failure can be 
repaired in the next planned overhaul. 
- Box 2687 (prepared): The best possible repairing time. The assumption is that the 
failure can be identified with the condition monitoring and that all the equipment 
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and spare parts are prepared for the repairing project. This scenario is applicable 
for all the same type of engines, no matter what installation. 
- Box 2688 (sudden): Repairing time when the failure occurs suddenly but does not 
cause any extra damages, only to a certain component. Repairing time could be a 
lot longer than in prepared (2687) repair since the failure occurs suddenly. 
Therefore, there might be a situation where equipment, repairing staff or spare 
parts are not available as quickly as in the prepared failure. Recovery time will be 
considered by the case-by-case approach, depending on installation. 
- Box 2690 (sudden with extra damages): The longest and the most expensive 
repairing process. Single component failure causes damage to multiple other 
components as well. In some cases, it is impossible to know how many 
components are actually broken before further inspection during the repairing. 
Also, some of the engine structures may have been damaged. 
 
Following screenshot (Figure 36.) demonstrates what does the actual FTA looks when 
boxes from installation (583) to internal system n’s Component 4 (2683) are expanded. 
FTA is explained Top-Down, but as mentioned, the FTA process is going to be executed 
in the Bottom-Up method. 
 
 
Figure 36. Screenshot of ELMAS 
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Summarizing the bottom-up method of FTA step by step: 
1. The first and lowest level is component’s failure box (2686), which is common to 
all four different paths. Failure rate, which in Wärtsilä case is MTTF, based on 
failure data and experts experience and knowledge, will be entered to the failure 
box (2686). Failure rate should also consider of operation profile and used fuel, 
since they effect on failure existence as well. For example, ship engine that is 
running by gas could not use heavy fuel oil using baseload power plant’s MTTF. 
2. Component level clarifies how to continue in the scenarios of planned (2684), 
prepared (2687), sudden (2688), and sudden with extra damages (2690) types of 
maintenance needs. This is the level where is calculated repairing time and cost 
in different scenarios. 
3. The next step is to calculate probabilities in which path the failure is proceeding 
into Component 4 (2683) box. By changing percentage-values of the lowest level 
components (2685 and 2686), it is possible to impact in the path that the failure 
might proceed to the higher level. This simulation could be used to steer condition 
monitoring so that all the failures would be “planned”, therefore sudden failures 
would not exist. The simulation takes also into account the repairing time, which 
is affected by the availability of spare parts, equipment and repairing staff, as well 
as those delivery time. Delivery time depends on installation case-by-case. 
4. This model of FTA software (installation 583) could be improved by adding 
planned repair costs. Changing the costs in the model simulates how to, for 
example, lengthening periodic overhaul intervals affects in the LCC. 
 
In practice, with the FTA software, it is possible to simulate what availability and 
reliability can be expected in the installation level and in the individual engines level. 
Availability is calculated from the relation of failure the amount and repair time, and 
reliability is calculated from amount of engine stopping failures. A result of simulation is 
components criticality rating, which is based on availability and reliability calculations. 
Also, calculating LCC is achievable when adding the real values of component costs, 
repairing costs, maintenance process costs, installation level costs of downtime, condition 
monitoring costs, and all the other installation specific costs. 
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With the FTA software, it is possible to simulate different scenarios for optimizing the 
maintenance plan to meet the customers’ needs. Comparing maintenance costs of 
standard maintenance manual to components criticality rate in specific installation, it is 
possible to review how the used maintenance budget meet in different components 
according to their criticality rate. Thereby recognizing if the maintenance plan needs 
improvement actions. For example, some of the components could be over-maintained, 
which means that the overhaul costs are too much on the non-critical component. On the 
other hand, some of the components may be under-maintained, which means that there is 
too little attention in very critical components. 
 
5.6.6. Step 6. LTA in business environment of Wärtsilä 
 
LTA defines component level failure modes occurrence in safety-, outage- or economics-
related areas. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the RCM process places each failure 
mode into one of four categories. First, need to be found out if the operator knows that 
something abnormal or harmful has occurred in the normal course of daily duties. After 
identifying the failure modes, both evident and hidden, and figuring out if these failure 
modes lead to a safety problem or not. 
 
Failures in standby systems or components are often hidden failures and remain so unless 
deliberate action is taken to find them. Since these types of systems are not part of the 
operation in the normal life of an engine, there is no sign of degradation, malfunctioning 
or failure, unless those are set into operation. Thereby, the recognition and classification 
of such system failures are challenging even with the help of IoT devices. 
 
Secondly, LTA of RCM asks if failures can lead to a safety problem. Considering if there 
is a chance for safety risk towards personnel (injury or death) or environment before 
changing the maintenance plan. During the LTA process, financial costs and components 
of which maintenance plan could be modified are identified. When identifying these 
factors, the question of the safety problem is asked. Safety concern includes both, 
personnel and environmental consequences. 
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Comparing to LTA in theory part, wherein the situation “is there evident” answer is yes, 
and then also positive answer for safety question, the analysis results “safety problem”. 
Not further analysis on how to manage the situation, nor how to continue. Hence, the 
results of the criticality analysis in the traditional model of RCM are not reliable or 
specific enough. RCM-based LTA in Wärtsilä’s business environment will figure out the 
safety problems cause, solve it, and then maintenance plan modification actions to best 
serve customers’ goals. 
 
Since the maintenance program is already existing there is no need to define if there is 
planned condition-dependent (CD) or time-dependent (TD) maintenance tasks, instead of 
defining if those tasks are efficient and if they can be modified. The intention of this 
whole process is to serve the customers in the best possible way to help them reach their 
goals. Typically, customers’ aim is to optimize maintenance management processes by 
minimizing the life cycle costs (LCC) or maximizing availability, not defining if the 
maintenance should be done or not. The aim is to go through all the components that need 
to be modified, which is based on the fact, that there is already existing a maintenance 
plan and the intention is to modify it. Following chart (Figure 37.) simulates modified 
LTA process to the environment of Wärtsilä: 
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Figure 37. RCM-based LTA to Wärtsilä Services environment 
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5.6.7. Step 7. Maintenance task modification 
 
In a modified and streamlined RCM process the fifth step simulates effects of the changes 
in the maintenance plan with the FTA process, and the sixth step goes through if the 
changes can be executed with the LTA process. The final (7th) step specifies the tasks, 
which tasks are profitable to change according to FTA, and which tasks can be improved 
according to LTA. 
 
Step 7 considers if the tasks are applicable and effective to modify and if those are 
adaptable in customers’ environment. Going through the already existing maintenance 
plan with Wärtsilä specialists to define of which are the customers’ needs for 
improvement. The focus could be minimizing the LCC costs, maximizing the availability 
and reliability, or optimizing all mentioned alternatives to the best-suited way. 
Modifications should not decrease the safety in any case. 
 
As the theory part suggests, run-to-failure (RTF) option for some components could be 
the best suitable option. Whether there is no applicable PM task, even to be modified, or 
the cost of an applicable PM task exceeds the cost of RTF. However, the maintenance 
plan should include potential costs of a worst-case scenario, before letting any component 
run until the failure. Worst-case scenario, such as component breakdown that causes 
damage in a turbocharger, would increase the actual costs a lot. This type of worst-case 
scenarios can be avoided with suitable condition monitoring. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
Research for this thesis was carried out in co-operation with Tuomas Kangas, Concept 
Manager in Wärtsilä Services, and Turkka Lehtinen, Senior Reliability Specialist in 
Ramentor Oy. Research results show that the RCM method is a suitable tool for 
developing the case company’s maintenance management processes. However, it needs 
to be modified to merge in Wärtsilä’s maintenance processes. 
 
The thesis focuses on exploring and simulating potential advantages of RCM method in 
practice for the case company. The study first discusses the basic elements of RCM 
procedures and then in more advantageous to enable the streamlined and modified process 
to be performed for Wärtsilä’s customers’ needs. 
 
Modified and streamlined RCM process that serves the best of Wärtsilä’s customers’ 
needs, should use the bottom-up method in failure tree analysis (FTA), which is replacing 
failure mode and effective analysis (FMEA & FMECA). Bottom-up method means 
finding and preventing failure modes begins from the lowest level of installation 
structure, the component level. In the component level, the most critical components 
should have the most attention from the beginning of the process, which means that the 
components that may cause the most repairing costs or the longest downtime should be 
taken care first. Experts knowledge and experience input has been used to recognize the 
components, which should be taken care of in the analysis, such as components repairing 
time, a chance for extra damage, etc.  
 
FTA software, in this research ELMAS, is in the big role to make the RCM process easier 
to deal with. Human errors are minimized after all the necessary information is defined 
to the software. FTA software can calculate installations different possibilities of risks, 
actual costs of LCC, availability, and reliability, in different scenarios. 
 
RCM-based Logic Tree Analysis is modified for the Wärtsilä Services environment. 
Modified LTA differs from the traditional LTA in many ways. Traditional LTA, 
mentioned in theory part, suggests that the analyzing process could stop when the solution 
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for failure mode cannot be found. Besides that, for the Wärtsilä environment modified 
LTA clarifies that (1) the relevant failures (evident and hidden) should be identified; (2) 
process should not stop if the solution is not found in the first place, rather the solution 
should be discovered in some alternative way; and that (3) aim is always to optimize 
customers’ maintenance processes as intended to help them reach their goals. It is possible 
of trying to reach the lowest possible LCC or the best possible availability, but optimizing 
these alternatives helps the customer to find the best suitable maintenance process, the 
golden mean. 
 
With the accurate knowledge of classification societies requirements for the Service 
Supplier notation, the documented process enables Wärtsilä to engage in discussions 
regarding approval for the streamlined RCM concept. Therefore, increasing the service 
portfolio and profitability is possible. In the future, modified and streamlined RCM 
process could be applied for other industries as well.  
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Appendix 1: Terminology 
 
Availability: Aspect of system reliability that considers equipment maintainability. 
Designing requires an evaluation of the consequences of unsuccessful operation or 
performance of integrated systems. The critical requirements necessary to restore 
operation or performance to design expectations. (Stapelberg, 2009:5) 
 
Co-creation: A business strategy focusing on customer experience and interactive 
relationships. Co-creation allows and encourages a more active involvement from the 
customer to create a value rich experience. (Business Dictionary, cited 12.12.2018) 
 
Failure: No success, the fact of someone or something not succeeding (Cambridge 
Dictionary, cited 7.12.2018) 
 
Maintainability: Aspect of maintenance that considers downtime of the systems. 
Designing requires an evaluation of the accessibility and repairability (i.e. ability to 
repair) of the inherent systemsand their related equipment in the failure event. Also 
integrated systems shutdown during planned maintenance is required in designing 
maintainability (Stapelberg, 2009:5-6) 
 
Reliability: Regarded as the probability of successful operation of performance of 
systems and their related equipment, with minimum risk of loss/disaster or system failure. 
Designing requires an evaluation of the effects of failure of the inherent systems and 
equipment. (Stapelberg, 2009:5) 
 
Safety: Classified to three categories: relating to personal protection; to equipment 
protection; and to environmental protection. Defined also as not involving risk. 
(Stapelberg, 2009:6) 
